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“Nationwide” Injunctions are Really “Universal” Injunctions and They Are
Never Appropriate
Howard M. Wasserman†
Introduction
Recent constitutional litigation has challenged the validity of laws, regulations,
and policies from the Obama and Trump Administrations regulating immigration
and immigration-adjacent matters. Plaintiffs have brought pre-enforcement lawsuits
seeking to enjoin responsible federal officials from enforcing the challenged laws,
regulations, and policies. Consider:
• The Fifth Circuit enjoined enforcement of President Obama’s Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”)
program, a decision affirmed by an evenly divided eight-person Supreme Court.1
• The Fourth and Ninth Circuits enjoined enforcement of President Trump’s
third Executive Order limiting travel to the United States by nationals of certain
majority-Muslim countries and heightening review procedures for admitting
refugees from certain countries,2 which the Supreme Court agreed to review during
the April sitting of October Term 2017.3 This followed decisions by both courts
enjoining enforcement of prior orders on the same issues.4
• District judges in the Northern District of California and in the Northern
District of Illinois enjoined enforcement of Department of Justice regulations
stripping “sanctuary cities” of federal funds from law-enforcement grant programs.5
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the latter decision.6
• A district judge in the Western District of Washington enjoined enforcement
of regulations requiring immigration attorneys to either appear and assume full
representation or refrain from giving legal advice to pro se parties to immigration
proceedings.7

Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. Thanks to Samuel Bray, Amanda Frost, David Marcus, Joelle
Moreno, James Pfander, and Adam Zimmerman and to my FIU colleagues for comments on earlier
drafts. Thanks to John Parry and the Law Review editors for inviting me to this program.
1 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by evenly divided Court, United States v.
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
2 IRAP IV, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2014); Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 674 (9th Cir. 2017) (Hawaii
III).
3 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018).
4 Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 789 (9th Cir. 2017) (Hawaii I), vacated as moot, Hawaii v. Trump, 874
F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 604 (4th Cir.
2017) (IRAP II), vacated as moot, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017); Washington
v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017).
5 Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp.
3d 497, 540 (N.D. Cal. 2017); see also Chicago v. Sessions, 2017 WL 4572208, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
6 Chicago v. Sessions, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (7th Cir. 2018).
7 Nw. Immigrant Rights Project v. Sessions, 2017 WL 3189032, at *7 (W.D. Wash. 2017).
†

• District judges in the Eastern District of New York8 and Northern District of
California9 enjoined enforcement of Trump Administration regulations rescinding
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program, which provided
discretionary relief for removal for certain undocumented individuals who arrived
as children.
Regardless of the correctness of the constitutional and statutory analysis in
these cases,10 a distinct problem involves the remedies imposed. Each of these
courts issued or affirmed injunctions protecting or purporting to protect not only
the named plaintiffs, but all persons. The injunctions prohibited or purported to
prohibit enforcement of the challenged laws, regulations, and policies not only
against the named plaintiffs, but against all persons everywhere who might be
subject to enforcement of those laws.11
These broad injunctions are problematic in two respects.
One problem involves nomenclature. Courts have labeled these “nationwide”
or even “worldwide”12 injunctions. But the problem with these injunctions is that
they prohibit government officials from enforcing the challenged laws, regulations,
and policies against the universe of persons who might be subject to enforcement,
regardless of whether they were parties to the lawsuit producing the injunction.
These injunctions are better described as “universal,”13 a term that suggests
something about the scope of the injunction with respect to who is protected and
from what. “Nationwide” speaks more to where protected persons enjoy those
protections.
The second problem is that by any name courts should not issue such broad
injunctions, certainly not as frequently, automatically, and seemingly unthinkingly as
they have been in immigration cases. Although the Supreme Court and lower
courts have issued or affirmed such injunctions in the past,14 issuance of universal
Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 407 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
Regents of Univ. of California v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1037
(N.D. Cal. 2018).
10 For scholarship considering the constitutional issues, see generally, e.g., Josh Blackman, The
Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L & POL. 213, 219 (2015);
Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part I: Congressional Acquiescence to Deferred Action, 103
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 96, 97 (2015); Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in
Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 88 (2016); Adam B. Cox and Christina M. Rodriguez, The
President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 107 (2015); Stella Burch Elias, Immigrant
Covering, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 765, 769 (2017); Christopher N. Lasch, et al, Understanding “Sanctuary
Cities”, 58 B.C. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2018); Earl Maltz, The Constitution and the Trump Travel Ban,
___ LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. ___ (2018).
11 Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419
(2017); see IRAP IV, 883 F.3d at 272-73; Batalla Vidal, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 437; Chicago, 264 F. Supp. 3d
at 951; Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 539.
12 Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 701, (9th Cir. 2017) (Hawaii III)
13 Thanks to Tobias Wolff for suggesting the better term. Bray uses “national” injunction to capture
the same idea of an injunction protecting beyond the plaintiffs. Bray, supra note 11, at 419 n.5.
14 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 436 (4th ed. 2010); Bray, supra note 11, at
437–45.
8
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injunctions has accelerated in recent years,15 even as courts16 and commentators17
insist that they should not be routine. Courts and commentators offer a variety of
reasons for issuing universal injunctions, from facial unconstitutionality18 to the
constitutional demand for uniform immigration19 law20 to judicial economy and
rule-of-law considerations that would be undermined if federal law were not
enforced against some and enforced against others.21 None of these justifications
withstands scrutiny. Universal injunctions remain inconsistent with the historic
scope of courts’ equity powers, as informed by Article III of the Constitution.22
They raise concerns for manipulative litigant behavior. And they are ungrounded in
the needs of the cases—nothing about these cases or the challenged laws,
regulations, and policies requires an injunction barring enforcement against all
persons who might be subject to the law.
As Samuel Bray argues, a “federal court should give an injunction that protects
the plaintiff vis-à-vis the defendant, wherever the plaintiff and the defendant may
both happen to be. The injunction should not constrain the defendant’s conduct
vis-à-vis nonparties.”23 Douglas Laycock similarly argues that “the court in an
individual action should not globally prohibit a government agency from enforcing
an invalid regulation; the court should order only that the invalid regulation not be
enforced against the individual plaintiff.”24 And as the Supreme Court stated in
Doran v. Salem Inn,25 “neither declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly interfere
with enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances except with respect to the
particular federal plaintiffs, and the State is free to prosecute others who may
violate the statute.”26
These scope-of-injunction concerns arise in constitutional litigation challenging
local,27 state,28 and federal29 laws. The present immigration and immigrationadjacent controversies discussed in this volume offer an appropriate opportunity to
consider the problem of the universal injunction, what proper injunctions should
Bray, supra note 11, at 437.
Id.
17 Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2018).
18 Chicago v. Sessions, 2017 WL 4572208 at *2; Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 507.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress “to establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization”).
20 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir. 2017) (IRAP II); Texas v.
United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2015).
21 Chicago v. Sessions, 2017 WL 4572208 at *4.
22 U.S. CONST. art. III.
23 Bray, supra note 11, at 469.
24 Id. at 276.
25 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 922 (1975).
26 Id. at 931.
27 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460 (1974).
28 Strawser v. Strange, 105 F. Supp. 3d 1323, 1330 (S.D. Ala. 2015); Josh Blackman and Howard M.
Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 244 (2016); Howard M.
Wasserman, Crazy in Alabama: Judicial Process and the Last Stand Against Marriage Equality in the Land of
George Wallace, 110 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 4–5 (2015).
29 See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935); Bray, supra note 11, at 433–35.
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look like, and how constitutional litigation and adjudication should proceed under
appropriately scoped judicial decrees, generally and in this class of actions. This
Paper focuses on six sets of federal laws, regulations, and policies governing or
related to immigration that have been subject to constitutional challenge in the past
decade and that have produced universal (although labeled nationwide) injunctions
barring enforcement of the law against all persons.
Part I considers litigation in six areas of immigration or immigration-adjacent
laws, regulations, and policies. Part II considers the nomenclature problem and
explains why the phrase “universal injunction,” rather than “nationwide
injunction,” better captures what courts have been doing. Part III argues that
universal injunctions are inappropriate as a matter of equitable principle, judicial
decisionmaking, and Article III of the Constitution, while considering and rejecting
the arguments courts and commentators have offered for such orders. Part IV
considers the appropriate scope of injunctions in the six immigration and
immigration-adjacent areas and how litigation would proceed under properly
scoped injunctions.
I. Injunctions in Immigration and Immigration-Adjacent Controversies
This Paper focuses on federal laws, regulations, and policies touching on
immigration and immigration-adjacent matters because that is the focus of this
volume and because these laws have been the targets of the highest-profile
universal injunctions in the past several years. Although the cases described below
label the injunctions “nationwide,” I will use the more-accurate “universal
injunction.” For present purposes, I remain agnostic to whether the courts were
correct in declaring these laws, regulations, and policies constitutionally or
statutorily invalid. My focus is on the appropriate scope of the injunctive remedy
upon a declaration of constitutional invalidity of the challenged laws, regulations,
and policies.
A. DAPA
The litigation that started the recent wave of universal injunctions against
federal immigration laws involved the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents30 (“DAPA”) program under President Obama, an
extension of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”).31 The basic
idea was that certain qualified individuals—primarily childhood arrivals and parents
of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents meeting additional conditions—who
SEC. JEH CHARLES JOHNSON, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion
with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain
Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (2014).
31SEC. JANET NAPOLITANO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (2012).
30

otherwise lack lawful immigration status in the United States would have their
removals deferred (or moved lower on the removal priority list) as a matter of
executive discretion and would become eligible for certain state and federal
benefits.32
Texas and 25 other states sued in the Southern District of Texas, alleging that
DAPA violated the Administrative Procedure Act33 and the President’s
constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”34 The
district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of DAPA in any state—that is, the
Department of Homeland Security could not defer removal or accord status
benefits to persons anywhere in the United States.35 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.36
As to the scope of the injunction, the court of appeals stated that partial
implementation of DAPA outside the 26 plaintiff states would undermine the
uniform and unified immigration law demanded by the Constitution and intended
by Congress.37 It also would render the injunction ineffective, because DAPA
beneficiaries from non-protected states remained free to move about the country
and enter protected states such as Texas.38
An eight-member Supreme Court affirmed the decision, including the universal
injunction, by an evenly divided Court.39
B. Travel Ban
The highest-profile use of universal injunctions has been in the wave of federal
litigation over President Trump’s “travel bans.”
In March 2017, Trump issued Executive Order No. 13780, entitled “Protecting
the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.”40 The order
imposed a 90-day ban on travel to the United States for nationals of six majorityMuslim nations, ordered federal agencies to review procedures for granting visas
for nationals of those nations, and ordered review of procedures for refugee

Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146–49 (5th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 149–50.
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
35 Texas, 809 F.3d at 146.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 187–88.
38 Id. at 188.
39 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016). The case was argued in spring 2016, during the
fourteen-month period between the February 2016 death of Justice Scalia and the April 2017
confirmation of Justice Gorsuch as his successor. Eric J. Segall, Eight Justices Are Enough: A Proposal to
Improve the United States Supreme Court 2 (Ga. State Univ. College of Law),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2900555.
40 Exec. Order No. 13780 of Mar. 6, 2017, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into
the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017) (to be codified in 3 C.F.R. (2018)).
32
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admissions.41 Several lawsuits followed, challenging the validity of the order on
First Amendment, equal protection, and statutory grounds.
The States of Washington and Minnesota sued in the Western District of
Washington. They argued that the order harmed the teaching and research missions
of their universities by restricting students, faculty, and other visiting scholars and
dignitaries who are nationals of the targeted countries and who are unable to study
and work at those institutions.42 The district court granted a temporary restraining
order, and the Ninth Circuit denied the government’s motion to stay the order
pending appeal, including its universal scope.43 The State of Hawaii and an
individual sued in the District of Hawaii; Hawaii claimed similar injury to its
universities, while the individual plaintiff claimed injury from the order preventing
his Syrian-national mother-in-law from visiting the United States.44
Three organizations and six individuals filed a separate action in the District of
Maryland. The individual plaintiffs were U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents
whose family members would be prevented or delayed from entering the United
States.45 The International Refugee Assistance Project46 (“IRAP”) and HIAS, Inc.47
assist refugees in resettling in the United States. The Middle East Studies
Association of North America is an organization of students and scholars of
Middle East studies, whose academic work would be limited by being unable to
interact with students and scholars from the targeted nations.48 The district court
enjoined all enforcement and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, identifying three reasons
for universality of the injunction—that plaintiffs are dispersed throughout the
country, the need for uniform immigration law, and the unique nature of the
Establishment Clause violation and the “message” of exclusion the order sent to
plaintiffs and non-plaintiffs alike.49
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hawaii and IRAP and stayed the
preliminary injunctions pending appeal, to the extent they prevented enforcement
with respect to nationals lacking “any bona fide relationship with a person or entity
in the United States.”50 It left the injunctions in effect “with respect to respondents
and those similarly situated.”51 The second executive order expired by its terms in

Id. This order revoked the first executive order, issued in January, which sparked its own wave of
emergency litigation. Cf. W. Bradley Wendel, Sally Yates, Ronald Dworkin, and the Best View of the Law,
115 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 78, 78 (2017).
42 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017).
43 Id. at 1166–67.
44 Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 789 (9th Cir. 2017) (Hawaii I).
45 International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 548 (D. Md. 2017) (IRAP
III).
46 Id. at 548–49.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 549.
49 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 604–05 (4th Cir. 2017) (IRAP II).
50 Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. 1, 9 (2017) (granting certiorari)).
51 Id.
41

fall 2017, prompting the Court to dismiss the appeals as moot, to vacate the lower
court’s judgments, and to order dismissal of the actions as moot.52
In September 2017, Trump issued Proclamation 9645, entitled “Enhancing
Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United
States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats.”53 This third travel order
identified eight countries (two of which—North Korea and Venezuela—are not
majority-Muslim) whose nationals should not be allowed entry to the United States.
The district court in Hawaii again enjoined enforcement.54 The Ninth Circuit
again affirmed a universal injunction, emphasizing the need for uniformity in
immigration policy and that any application of the Proclamation to others beyond
the plaintiffs would violate federal law.55 But the court rejected a “worldwide
injunction” protecting foreign nationals lacking a credible claim of a bona fide
relationship with a person or entity in the United States.56
In IRAP, the district court enjoined enforcement of the Proclamation and
again imposed the injunction universally, emphasizing the special problems of a law
that violates the Establishment Clause with a message of ostracism that affects
everyone, beyond the plaintiffs.57 The Fourth Circuit largely affirmed as to the six
majority-Muslim countries, but not as to North Korea and Venezuela. It required
that IRAP and other resettlement-organization plaintiffs similarly show a bona fide
relationship with potential refugee clients that is “’formal, documented, and formed
in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading the travel
restrictions.”58 The universal scope was appropriate because plaintiffs are scattered
throughout the country, making piecemeal injunction relief difficult; Congress has
an interest in uniform immigration law; and enjoining enforcement of a regulation
issued in violation of the Constitution only as to the plaintiff “would not cure its
deficiencies.”59
The Supreme Court granted cert in Hawaii,60 while leaving the IRAP petitions
untouched, likely awaiting resolution of Hawaii. The Court ordered the parties to
brief the scope of the injunction. Arguments in April 2018 included a brief
exchange on scope-of-injunction, with Justice Gorsuch questioning counsel for
Hawaii about the “really new development where a district court asserts the right to
strike down a – a federal statute with regard to anybody anywhere in the world.”61

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 377, 377 (2017).
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017).
54 Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 673 (9th Cir. 2017).
55 Id. at 701–02.
56 Id.
57International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 632 (D. Md. 2017) (IRAP
III).
58 IRAP IV, 883 F.3d 233, 272-73 (4th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting Trump, 137 S. Ct. at 2088)).
59 Id. at 273.
60 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018).
61 Oral argument in Trump v. Hawaii
52
53

C. “Sanctuary Cities”
The Department of Justice imposed new conditions on federal programs
providing grants to state, county, and municipal law enforcement. The regulations
would require withholding of federal funds to “sanctuary cities” that failed or
declined to assist the federal government in enforcing immigration laws, especially
by notifying federal agencies of the identity and location of persons within those
cities unlawfully present in the United States and by declining to continue to hold
persons detained on state and local charges for additional periods to allow federal
immigration officials to take them into immigration detention.62
The County of Santa Clara and the City and County of San Francisco
challenged the funding restrictions in the Northern District of California, arguing
that the funding restrictions violated separation of powers, the Tenth Amendment,
and Fifth Amendment due process.63 The district court preliminarily,64 then
permanently,65 enjoined DOJ officials from enforcing the restrictions or stripping
state and local law-enforcement agencies of federal funds. The district court
enjoined the defendants from enforcing the regulations as to all funding of all state
and local governments; it emphasized the facial unconstitutionality of the
regulations and that the violations were not limited to Santa Clara and San
Francisco, but applied to all jurisdictions nationwide.66
The City of Chicago filed a similar action in the Northern District of Illinois,
challenging the threat to withhold funds from one grant. That court also enjoined
enforcement universally, finding “no reason to think that the legal issues present in
this case are restricted to Chicago or that the statutory authority given to the
Attorney General would differ in another jurisdiction.”67
In denying a motion to stay the injunction pending appeal, the district court
offered the first comprehensive analysis and justification for a universal injunction,
emphasizing several points. The City made a facial challenge to the federal laws and
regulations at issue, so the government’s power and the constitutional violation
would be the same as to all entities nationwide.68 The district court cited cases
issuing or affirming universal injunctions in immigration cases, with the Supreme
Court at least tacitly validating the practice.69 Judicial economy counseled against
requiring other jurisdictions to file their own lawsuits to obtain injunctions barring
enforcement as to them (with the decision in Chicago serving as at-least persuasive
authority), especially because 37 cities and counties had submitted amicus briefs in
Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 937–38 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F.
Supp. 3d 497, 509–11 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
63 Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 507.
64 Id. at 508–09.
65 Santa Clara v. Trump, 2017 WL 5569835 at *17 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
66 Id.; Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 539.
67 Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d at 951.
68 Chicago v. Sessions, 2017 WL 4572208, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
69 Id.
62

support of Chicago.70 The court recognized recent scholarship raising concerns
with the practice; it acknowledged that a universal injunction should not be the
default approach, but should be limited to extraordinary cases.71 But this was the
extraordinary case, given concerns for federal uniformity, the unfairness resulting
from enforcement against some municipalities and not others, and concerns for the
rule of law.72
A divided panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed, offering a similarly
comprehensive defense of universal injunctions.73 While agreeing that universal
injunctions “should be utilized only in rare circumstances”74 and that they were “a
powerful remedy that should be employed with discretion,”75 the majority justified
the universal injunction in this case because it presented “essentially a facial
challenge to a policy applied nationwide” and the format of the policy rendered
individual relief ineffective in providing full relief.76 Although the panel was
unanimous in declaring the funding regulations constitutionally invalid and
enjoining DOJ from stripping funds from Chicago, Judge Manion criticized the
universality of the injunction as a “gratuitous application of an extreme remedy.”77
D. Regulating Attorneys in Immigration Proceedings
The Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”), part of DOJ, enforces
regulations of attorneys practicing in immigration proceedings. One regulation
required attorneys to file a notice of appearance when the attorney engaged in
“practice” or “preparation” in a proceeding, the latter including incidental advice,
activities, or preparation, even those activities outside full representation.78 The
effect of the regulation was that attorneys must appear and undertake full legal
representation in cases, whereas attorney and advocacy groups often provided
limited assistance for parties otherwise proceeding pro se.79
The Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (“NWIRP”) provides legal services in
immigration proceedings in Washington, sometimes appearing as counsel and
sometimes advising pro se litigants. It received a cease-and-desist letter from EOIR,
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
72 Id. at *4–5.
73 Chicago v. Sessions, ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. 2018).
74 Id. at ___ (slip op. at 26)
75 Id. at ___ (slip op. at 29).
76 Id. at ___ (slip op. at 30).
77 Id. at ___ (slip op. at 42 (Manion, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
78 Nw. Immigrant Rights Project v. Sessions, 2017 WL 3189032, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 2017).
79 Id Northwest Immigrant Rights Project79 (“NWIRP”) illustrates the distinction. The injunction was
properly and appropriately nationwide in that by prohibiting the federal government from enforcing
the attorney regulations on NWIRP, the district court necessary prohibited enforcement of the
regulations against NWIRP anywhere in the United States it may attempt to provide legal services in
immigration proceedings. NWIRP works in Washington,79. at *1–2.
70
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ordering it to stop providing any assistance in any proceedings without appearing
and providing full representation, something NWIRP alleged it lacked resources to
do.80 NWIRP filed suit in the Western District of Washington, alleging that the
regulations violated the First Amendment, by interfering with communications
between NWIRP and parties to immigration proceedings, and the Tenth
Amendment, by infringing on the state power to regulate attorneys.81 The court
preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the cease-and-desist letter and the regulations
pursuant to which the letter issued. It recognized EOIR’s stated intention to
enforce the regulations to other attorneys and applied the injunction to “any other
similarly situated non-profit organizations who, like NWIRP, self-identify and
disclose their assistance on pro se filings.”82
E. Abortion Access for Detained Undocumented Unaccompanied Minors
This is the class of immigration-adjacent litigation that did not produce an
unwarranted universal injunction, but instead proceeded according to appropriate
remedial procedures. Plaintiffs challenged policies of the Office of Refugee
Settlement (an agency in the Department of Health and Human Services) refusing
to allow unaccompanied undocumented minors in Health and Human Services
(HHS) detention to terminate pregnancies.83 A lawsuit filed by a guardian ad litem
produced two district court injunctions compelling HHS to permit three girls
(identified as J.D., J.R., and J.P.) to obtain abortions.84 The judge expressly
prohibited HHS officials from interfering or retaliating against the three girls for
obtaining abortions, but made no mention of, and did not extend the order to,
other, similarly situated detainees.85
The district then certified a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(2) of “all pregnant, unaccompanied immigrant minor children (UCs) who are
or will be in the legal custody of the federal government” and granted a class-wide
preliminary injunction.86
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2–6.
82 Id. at *7.
83 Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (order denying stay); id. at 736
(Millett, J., concurring); id. at 743 (Henderson, J., dissenting); see also Marty Lederman, Lawless and
Cruel: The HHS Abortion Scandal That’s Flying Under the Radar, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/12/lawless-and-cruel-hhs-abortion-scandal.html [hereinafter
Lederman, Lawless and Cruel]; Marty Lederman, The SG’s Remarkable Cert. Petition in Hargan v. Garza, the
“Jane Doe” Abortion Case, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 8, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/thesgs-remarkable-cert-petition-in.html [hereinafter Lederman, The SG’s Remarkable Cert. Petition]; Michael
C. Dorf, The Troublingly Widening Gyre of Complicity Claims, VERDICT: JUSTICIA (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://verdict.justia.com/2017/11/01/troublingly-widening-gyre-complicity-claims.
84 Garza v. Hargan, 2017 WL 6462270, at *2–3 (D.D.C. 2017); Garza v. Hargan, 2017 WL 4707287, at
*1 (D.D.C. 2017).
85 Garza, 2017 WL 4707287 at *1.
86 Garza v. Hargan, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2018 WL 1567600, *1 (D.D.C. 2018).
80
81

F. DACA Rescission
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security created DACA, a program
permitting certain individuals without lawful immigration status who entered the
United States as children to obtain contingent discretionary relief from deportation
and authorization to work legally in the United States. In 2017, DHS announced a
gradual end to DACA.87
In the Northern District of California, five groups of plaintiffs filed non-class
actions. The plaintiffs were the President and Regents of the University of
California, four states, a city, a county, a union, and several individual DACA
recipients; they argued the rescission violated the APA. The district agreed the new
order was invalid and ordered DHS to “maintain the DACA program on a
nationwide basis.”88 It insisted that the scope of the injunction was appropriate
given the strong interest in uniform immigration law and the problem of DACA
rescission affecting every state and territory of the United States. “Limiting relief to
the States in suit or the Individual Plaintiffs would result in administrative
confusion and simply provoke many thousands of individual lawsuits all over the
country.”89
A different group of plaintiffs filed suit in the Eastern District of New York.
Plaintiffs included individuals and fifteen states and the District of Columbia,
alleging violations of Equal Protection and Due Process and the APA. The district
court enjoined DACA rescission “on a universal or ‘nationwide’ basis,” using the
terms synonymously.90 It insisted it did not do so “lightly” and recognized
commentary criticizing the practice.91 It emphasized the strong federal interest in
uniform immigration law, as well as how impractical it would be to issue a narrower
injunction that sufficiently protected plaintiffs’ interest, in light of the ability of
people to move from state to state and job to job.92
A third action was brought in the District of the District of Columbia by two
sets of plaintiffs, one led by Princeton University and one of its graduates (a DACA
recipient) and one led by the NAACP and two labor unions.93 The court rejected
the government’s argument that any remedy should be limited to the plaintiffs,
citing Texas and the need for uniform immigration law.94 Rather than enjoining
Regents of Univ. of California v. United States Dep’t. of Homeland Security, 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011,
1022-23, 1025-26 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Batalla Vidal v. Nielson, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 407, 413-16
(E.D.N.Y. 2018); Batalla Vidal v. Duke, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2017 WL 5201116, *2-4 (E.D.N.Y.
2017).
88 Regents, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 1048.
89 Id. at 1049.
90 Batalla Vidal, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 437.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 438.
93 NAACP v. Trump, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___ (D.D.C. 2018) (slip op. at 14).
94 Id. at ___ (slip op. at 49).
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enforcement of the rescission regulation, the court vacated the order rescinding
DACA as lacking sufficient reasoned explanation, but stayed the vacatur to give the
department a chance to offer a fuller and proper justification for the order.95
II. Universal (Not Nationwide)
The first problem with these broad injunctions involves nomenclature, in
labeling them “nationwide” injunctions rather than “universal” injunctions.
The scope of an injunction involves two distinct considerations—“who” and
“where.” “Who” refers to the persons protected and bound by the injunction—
who enjoys the blanket of the court’s power, who can return to court to enforce the
injunction if it is disobeyed, and who is bound to act or refrain from acting in some
respect.96 “Where” refers to the “territorial breadth” or geographic scope of the
order, where the injunction and court’s enforcement power can find those
protected or bound by an injunction. In the context of pre-enforcement
constitutional litigation at issue, “where” means the place in the country the
government is barred from enforcing the law; “who” means against what persons it
is barred from enforcing the challenged law and against what persons it remains
free from judicial decree to enforce the challenged law.
Courts conflate these distinct aspects in describing the central choice as
between nationwide relief and relief limited to the plaintiffs.97 One judge in the
Northern District of California erroneously framed the issue as whether the
injunction “should be issued only with regards to the plaintiffs and should not
apply nationwide.”98 The Seventh Circuit spoke of “relief limited in geographic
scope” producing multiple litigation,99 misunderstanding that multiple litigation
(involving new parties) derives from the limited “who” of an individual injunction,
not from the broader “where.” At the same time, the terms should not be used
interchangeably or synonymously.100
It is “inapt”101 to describe these injunctions as nationwide or to justify them on
the conclusion that plaintiffs “established injury that reaches beyond the
geographical bounds” of the judicial district or state.102 Both framings speak to the
injunction’s where. So understood, all injunctions are and should be nationwide and
should reach beyond the geographical bounds of the issuing judicial district. All
injunctions should protect the plaintiff against defendants’ unconstitutional or
unlawful conduct throughout the nation, wherever the plaintiff may be or should
95
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go. That is, government officials are and should be prohibited from enforcing the
constitutionally defective law or regulation against the protected party wherever the
protected party may be or should go. Rights are violated by threatened enforcement
of a constitutionally defective law wherever the rights-holder goes, and the
injunction protecting her against those rights violations protects her wherever she
goes.
The significant feature of the injunctions in these immigration cases is that they
prohibit enforcement of the challenged law, regulation, or policy against the
universe of people who might be subject to enforcement of the challenged law,
regulation or policy, whether parties to the constitutional litigation or otherwise.
The injunctions attempt to prohibit government officials from enforcing the
challenged laws against the universe of all persons and entities, not only the named
plaintiffs. Justice Gorsuch recognized the problem as injunctions “not limited to
relief for the parties at issue” striking down “a federal statute with regard to
anybody anywhere in the world.”103 The appropriate term for such injunctions
reaching a broad “who” is “universal,” because they purport to bar enforcement
against the universe of people, parties or otherwise, against whom the challenged
law might be enforced.
Because “nationwide” and “universal” address different aspects of the scope of
a judicial order, they are not synonymous or interchangeable—an injunction can be
both nationwide and universal. Injunctions are nationwide in protecting the named
plaintiffs against enforcement of the constitutionally defective laws throughout the
nation, wherever the plaintiffs are or go; that is proper and unremarkable. This is
consistent with Califano v. Yamasaki,104 where the Supreme Court approved
application of an injunction that protected a plaintiff class spread throughout the
country, because the entire class was before the court and the court’s equitable
powers allowed it to protect those before it, regardless of their location.105
Injunctions are nationwide because injunctions should be nationwide, at least where
plaintiffs are persons who may move around the country and might be subject to
the challenged law, regulation, or policy throughout the nation. Injunctions become
universal (although courts have not used the term) in purporting to protect the
universe of people from enforcement of the constitutionally defective laws,
regulations, and policies.
NWIRP106 illustrates the distinction. By prohibiting the federal government
from enforcing the attorney regulations against NWIRP, the district court
necessarily prohibited enforcement of the regulations against NWIRP anywhere in
the United States it may attempt to provide legal services in immigration
proceedings. NWIRP works in Washington,107 so the injunction obviously prohibits
enforcement in proceedings held there. But if NWIRP began providing legal
Argument in Trump v. Hawaii at 72-73.
442 U.S. 682 (1979).
105 Id. at 702, 706.
106 Nw. Immigrant Rights Project v. Sessions, 2017 WL 3189032 at *7 (W.D. Wash. 2017).
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services in immigration proceedings in Oregon or Texas or Florida or Maine, the
injunction would bar enforcement of the regulations in those proceedings. The
protection that the injunction afforded to NWIRP against enforcement applied
wherever NWIRP was and wherever it might otherwise be subject to enforcement.
This made the injunction properly and appropriately nationwide. The problem is
that the district court extended the “who” of the injunction, purporting and
intending to protect other immigration attorneys and representation organizations
against enforcement of those regulations. It prohibited enforcement of the
challenged regulations not only against NWIRP, but against all other attorneys and
representation organizations.108
Chicago v. Sessions109 similarly wielded the wrong nomenclature. The injunction
should protect Chicago nationwide, ensuring it retains its federal funding
everywhere it goes—although that has no practical effect because the City of
Chicago, unlike NWIRP, cannot leave the Northern District of Illinois. Butr he
district court made, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, an extended “who” by
purporting and intending to protect other sanctuary cities from losing their funding
to DOJ regulations.
Bray recognizes that it is more appropriate to speak of the scope of an
injunction in terms of universality than nationwide, but expresses concern that
universality may fail to capture “the distinctive fact that these injunctions constrain
the national government, as opposed to state governments.”110 But universality—
enjoining the defendant’s constitutionally defective conduct with respect to the
universe of prospective enforcement targets—remains the central idea and central
problem, regardless of the source of the challenged law. The difference between a
universal injunction prohibiting enforcement of a federal law and a universal
injunction prohibiting enforcement of a state law is the size of the universes against
whom enforcement is proscribed. But the concept remains appropriate.
In Koontz v. Watson, the District of Kansas declared constitutionally invalid a
Kansas law requiring all persons who contract with the state to certify that they are
not involved in boycotts of Israel.111 The plaintiff, a teacher hired to conduct
teacher-training programs, alleged that the law violated the First Amendment and
the court agreed. The injunction prohibited the state from enforcing any statute,
law, policy, or practice requiring independent contractors to declare that they are
not participating in a boycott of Israel and prohibited the state “from requiring any
independent contractor” to certify that they are not participating in a boycott of
Israel as a condition of contracting with the state.112 That injunction was
universal—prohibiting enforcement of any state laws against any potential
contractors with the state, regardless of who those contractors are, where they are,
what they are contracting for, and what laws they are subject to.
Id. at * 7.
Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 937–38 (N.D. Ill. 2017), aff’d ___ F.3d ___ (7th
Cir. 2018).
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An injunction prohibiting enforcement of a state law should be as nationwide
as an injunction prohibiting enforcement of federal law—it should protect the
plaintiff against enforcement of the constitutionally defective state law everywhere
she is or goes in the United States. This is less of a practical problem with state laws
because of constitutional and prudential limits on extraterritorial application of state
laws. But that renders a nationwide injunction unnecessary; it does not render the
terminology inapplicable. If a court enjoins Florida from enforcing a law
prohibiting flag-burning against the plaintiff, the injunction prohibits Alabama from
enforcing that law anywhere the plaintiff might burn a flag. Limits on
extraterritorial application of Florida’s flag-burning law also prohibit that
prosecution.
While calling beyond-the-plaintiff injunctions “nationwide” is inappropriate,
universality is not the only available term to capture the real issue of “who.” Bray
uses “national” to describe an injunction protecting the “nation” of persons against
enforcement.113 Justice Gorsuch, perhaps sarcastically, called it a “cosmic
injunction.”114 Michael Morley frames the issue around the “orientation” of the
injunction. A plaintiff-oriented injunction “vindicates the plaintiffs’ rights, but
otherwise leaves the underlying statute or regulation undisturbed.”115 A defendantoriented injunction allows a single judge in one case “to completely prohibit the
defendant agency or official from enforcing the challenged provision against
anyone throughout the state or nation,” the equivalent of a universal injunction.116
With the proper terms in mind, it should be clear that the problem with the
injunctions in these immigration and immigration-adjacent cases has not been their
nationwide scope, in protecting prevailing plaintiffs everywhere. The point of
contention and controversy has been their universality in protecting a universe of
people beyond the plaintiff.
Part III turns to that problem.
III. Never Appropriate, By Any Label
By any label, courts should not issue the universal injunctions they have in
these cases, which prohibit defendant federal officials from enforcing the
challenged laws, regulations, and policies against the universe of any person
anywhere who may be subject to enforcement, beyond the named plaintiffs in
those cases. They certainly should not issue as frequently, unthinkingly, and
automatically as they have been. “Universal” injunctions were not unheard-of prior
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to Texas v. United States and these cases; the practice traces to the 1960s and ‘70s.117
But their issuance has accelerated in recent years.118
Whatever courts have done descriptively, universal injunctions are normatively
inappropriate. As Bray argues, a “federal court should give an injunction that
protects the plaintiff vis-à-vis the defendant, wherever the plaintiff and the
defendant may both happen to be. The injunction should not constrain the
defendant’s conduct vis-à-vis nonparties.”119 Laycock agrees that the power to issue
injunctions that protect beyond the plaintiffs in individual actions is “rather
doubtful.”120 He similarly proposes that “the court in an individual action should
not globally prohibit a government agency from enforcing an invalid regulation; the
court should order only that the invalid regulation not be enforced against the
individual plaintiff.”121 The Supreme Court endorsed this limited scope for
injunctions in Doran v. Salem Inn,122 stating that “neither declaratory nor injunctive
relief can directly interfere with enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances
except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs, and the State is free to
prosecute others who may violate the statute.”123
This Part offers the scholarly case against universal injunctions and shows the
problems with the judicial justifications for universal injunctions in these cases.
A. Equitable Principles and the Scope of Injunctions
Two competing principles guide courts in defining the proper scope of an
injunction. First, the “scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the
[constitutional] violation established”124 and the injunctive remedy should be
commensurate with and match the constitutional violation.125 Second, “injunctive
relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide
complete relief to the plaintiffs.”126 Courts in these immigration cases have justified
universal injunctions by reference to both the remedy-matches-the-violation127 and
the no-more-burdensome128 principles.
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1. Conceptualizing constitutional litigation
Whether either stated principle supports a universal injunction depends on how
courts conceptualize constitutional litigation, what is before a court in
constitutional litigation, and what the court is asked to do in resolving the case. The
trend towards universal injunctions reflects a conceptual shift in that judicial
understanding.
Historically, constitutional litigation sought anti-suit injunctions, in which a
plaintiff sought federal-court orders directing public officials to halt enforcement of
the challenged law in a judicial proceeding initiated against the federal plaintiffs.129
The court declares the constitutional validity of the challenged law, but as an
incident of preventing or remedying the wrong to the individual130 and only to the
extent the government defendants threatened to enforce the law against the
plaintiff.131 Kevin Walsh describes pre-enforcement constitutional action as an “in
personam litigation in which the court is asked to decide the respective rights and
duties of persons under law. If the plaintiff's preenforcement challenge is
successful, the remedy issued runs against the defendant as a person.”132 If a law or
regulation is (in the language of Marbury v. Madison,133) “repugnant” to the
Constitution, a court must refuse to apply it as a rule of decision.134 A court issuing
an anti-suit injunction prohibits public officials from initiating an enforcement
proceeding, thereby prohibiting the challenged law or regulation from serving as
the rule of decision in that underlying proceeding.
Conceptualizing constitutional rights and litigation this way, a court should not
make the injunction universal because the point of the action is not the declaration
of the law’s constitutional validity, but halting enforcement of the challenged law as
to the plaintiff.135 The paradigm constitutional case for this model is Ex Parte
Young,136 which recognized preemptive constitutional actions by potential
enforcement defendants (the railroad and its officers) against executive officials (the
state attorney general) to halt enforcement of constitutionally defective laws against
it.137
Either scope-of-injunction principle supports limiting injunctions to the
plaintiffs. Consider Chicago v. Sessions. DOJ threatened to deny federal lawenforcement funds to Chicago, pursuant to federal regulations, because Chicago
operates as a sanctuary jurisdiction and refuses to aid federal enforcement of
immigration laws. Chicago obtains complete relief if the injunction prohibits DOJ
from enforcing those regulations and from denying funds to Chicago; Chicago’s
See Bray, supra note 11, at 449–50.
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relief does not lose complete relief and its relief does not become less than
complete if DOJ denies funds to San Francisco or Santa Clara. Similarly, the
constitutional violation is the denial of funds to Chicago pursuant to the
regulations, not the regulations themselves; an injunction prohibiting enforcement
of the regulations and denial of funds to Chicago matches and remedies, and is
commensurate with, the constitutional violation in the case.
But federal courts and litigants have adopted a new conception of
constitutional rights and constitutional litigation. On this conception, the court’s
power is directed not to protecting an individual or entity against enforcement of a
constitutionally defective law or regulation, but to attacking the defective law or
regulation itself. Judges see themselves as “invalidating” or “striking down” or
“setting aside” or “nullifying” or “blocking” unconstitutional laws, acting against
the constitutionally defective law itself to eliminate and render it non-existent.138
The challenged law or regulation is treated as a res on which the court acts for all
purposes and all persons.139
If the court’s determination of constitutional invalidity “obliterates” the law, a
universal injunction has “relentless logic,”140 offering a remedy that logically must
benefit all persons and purposes from an entirely invalid law. If a law as a thing is
unconstitutional, it is undeserving of any respect, and continued enforcement to
anyone, anywhere, would suggest the law retains that respect. If the constitutional
violation is the very existence of the law, then only a universal injunction is
commensurate with and matches that violation.
Courts issuing universal injunctions in these immigration cases rely on this
newer conception of constitutional litigation. Courts target the “legal issues” raised
in the case, considering the laws challenged and the constitutional flaws in those
laws, all of which apply nationwide and not limited to the particular plaintiff.141 The
legal problems in denying sanctuary cities funding were not restricted to Chicago,
because the authority impermissibly wielded by the Attorney General in denying (or
threatening to deny) funding would be the same in Chicago as in another
jurisdiction.142 A limited injunction could not resolve the constitutional defects of
the funding regulations themselves.
In rejecting the government’s argument for a non-universal injunction in
Chicago, the court insisted that a narrower injunction would “allow the Attorney
General to impose what this Court has ruled are likely unconstitutional conditions
across a number of jurisdictions” and to “continue enforcing likely invalid
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conditions” against other cities and counties.143 Santa Clara similarly insisted that
the “constitutional violations” it found in the funding regulations “apply equally to
all states and local jurisdictions.”144 The Fourth Circuit in IRAP II stated that
enjoining the federal government only as to the plaintiffs “would not cure the
constitutional deficiency, which would endure” in all other applications of the
executive order.145 In IRAP IV, the same court insisted that because “we find that
the Proclamation was issued in violation of the Constitution, enjoining it only as to
Plaintiffs would not cure its deficiencies,” which “endure” in all other applications
of the executive order.146
This conception, Jonathan Mitchell argues, sees judicial review as a writ of
erasure. A “judicial pronouncement of unconstitutionality has canceled or blotted
out a duly enacted statute.”147 Non-enforcement of a statute becomes suspension
or revocation.148
It is not clear when the conceptual shift occurred,149 although it can be tied to
two developments. Bray points to enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act150 in
1934 as changing the constitutional understanding; by allowing courts to “declare”
rights, it encouraged judges to think of litigation as a challenge to the law itself.151 A
second change is the expansion of Ex Parte Young152 beyond antisuit injunctions153
to all lawsuits seeking “relief properly characterized as prospective” from
enforcement of constitutionally defective laws, regardless of the form of that
enforcement.154 Pre-enforcement injunctive actions seek to halt not only judicial
proceedings to enforce the challenged law (such as the threatened criminal
prosecution in Young),155 but non-judicial enforcement actions by non-judicial
actors, such as a county clerk denying a marriage license to a same-sex couple156 or
Marshals shackling defendants during criminal proceedings157 or DOJ denying a
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sanctuary municipality federal funds.158 The prospective relief no longer is about
stopping a discrete judicial proceeding involving enforcement of a law against
discrete parties; it is about eliminating the challenged law itself.
Frost frames the dueling conceptions of constitutional litigation in terms of
dueling conceptions of the judicial role—between resolving disputes between
parties and declaring the meaning of the law for everyone. She argues that critics of
universal injunctions view the primary judicial role as resolving individual disputes,
with the law-declaration power as incidental to that primary role.159 The newer
conception of constitutional litigation conforms to a shifted focus to the lawdeclaration role.
2. In Defense of the Traditional Conception
The traditional conception, and the particularized, non-universal injunctions
the traditional conception supports, represents a more appropriate approach to
constitutional litigation for three reasons. It better describes what happens in
constitutional litigation, it is more consistent with Article III limits on the
jurisdiction of federal courts, and it better controls litigant behavior.
a. Describing Constitutional Litigation
The traditional conception better describes what happens in constitutional
litigation.
One way to see this is by imagining these constitutional issues resolved not in
preemptive actions initiated by the right-holders enjoining enforcement, but in a
government-initiated enforcement action. Government enforces the challenged law
by initiating an enforcement proceeding against the rights-holder, who raises the
constitutional validity of the law being enforced as a defense to enforcement
liability. If the court agrees that the law is constitutionally invalid, it dismisses the
action or otherwise resolves the proceeding in favor of the rights-holder. The
court’s order dismissing the enforcement action speaks to the rights-holding
defendant, but does not speak to or affect other people. Nor does it affect the law
itself, which remains undisturbed.160 This is Marbury—understanding that a law or
regulation is repugnant to the Constitution, the court refuses to apply it as rule of
decision in that proceeding, leaving no valid law to be applied and requiring
dismissal of the proceeding.161
Consider, again, the attorney regulations in NWIRP. If NWIRP continues to
advise pro se litigants without filing the required notice of appearance, EOIR would
institute a disciplinary proceeding against NWIRP within the immigration court.
NWIRP would defend in the proceeding by arguing that the attorney regulations
Chicago, 264 F. Supp. 3d at 937–38; Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at, 509–11.
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are repugnant to the First Amendment and cannot form the basis for disciplining it,
based on the same arguments as in the preemptive suit in federal court. And if the
body hearing the attorney-disciplinary action agrees that the regulations are
constitutionally invalid, it would find in favor of NWIRP and resolve the
disciplinary proceeding in its favor, finding no constitutionally valid regulation to
use as the rule of decision. But that remedy, even if based on a finding of a
constitutional defect in the regulations, protects only NWIRP, no other attorneys
or representative organizations. It follows that the preemptive federal injunctive
action NWIRP files to prohibit EOIP from commencing future disciplinary
proceedings against it should produce an injunctive remedy that similarly protects
only NWIRP.
A second way to see this is to identify the precise constitutional violation. The
violation is neither the enactment nor existence of an unconstitutional law,
regulation, or policy; the violation is the enforcement or threatened enforcement of
that law, regulation, or policy against particular persons. Describing the remedy as
“striking down the law”162 or “declaring the law unconstitutional” does not
accurately describe the results or effects of litigation. A law declared constitutionally
invalid does not disappear—it remains in the United States Code and Congress is
not compelled to repeal or amend it. The court’s judgment prevents enforcement
of the law by those executive officers charged with carrying out legislative
directives,163 with enforcement requiring a particular target. It follows that an
injunction preventing that enforcement against the target remedies the
constitutional violation, without having to do more.
Mitchell labels this the “writ-of-erasure fallacy,” defined as “the assumption
that a judicial pronouncement of unconstitutionality has canceled or blotted out a
duly enacted statute, when the court’s ruling is in fact more limited in scope and
leaves room for the statute to continue to operate.”164 Judges, politicians, and the
public regard “judicially disapproved statutes” as legal nullities, although they
remain on the books and continue to operate as law, a mindset that “has needlessly
truncated the scope and effect of many federal and state statutes.”165 Instead, “[a]ll
a court can do is decline to enforce the statute and enjoin the executive from
enforcing it.”166 The injunction is “nothing more than a judicially imposed nonenforcement policy.”167 Mitchell’s proper conception of the effect of judicial review
can merge with the party-specific narrowness of ordinary litigation to produce
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particularized, non-universal injunctions, stopping the executive from enforcing as
to particular persons, not as to the universe.168
b. Article III Limits
The traditional conception and non-universal, particularized injunctive relief
better conforms to limits on the power of federal courts.
Federal courts possess power under Article III to decide “case[s]” and
“controvers[ies],”169 which means power to decide cases or controversies for
particular parties to a particular legal dispute.170 Courts do not decide general or
abstract legal issues to provide remedies for people not before the court.171 Morley
frames this around standing. A plaintiff has Article III standing to obtain injunctive
relief only by showing that she suffers ongoing, impending, or substantially likely
harm, usually from the threatened enforcement of the challenged law against her.172
The existence of a law, without a credible threat of enforcement of that law against
her, is insufficient to confer standing.173 Threats of enforcement to persons other
than the plaintiff are insufficient to confer standing on that plaintiff.174 Nor are
generalized threats of enforcement as to the public as a whole that are not specific
or unique to the plaintiff.175
Universal injunctions become possible because of what Aaron-Andrew Bruhl
derides as the “one good plaintiff” rule—courts adjudicate, and provide a broad
equitable remedy in, multi-party actions so long as one plaintiff can show standing,
without determining standing for every plaintiff.176 They do so believing that an
injunctive applies to everyone, so is necessary to find only one person with
standing. The Fourth Circuit proceeded to the constitutional merits of the challenge
to the travel after finding that one individual plaintiff had standing, deeming it
unnecessary to consider standing of other plaintiffs, such as IRAP or the scholarly
association.177 The Fifth Circuit in Texas v. United States similarly stopped its
standing inquiry with Texas.178 Bruhl argues that courts would be more constrained
in issuing remedies if they were more constrained in thinking about standing. If
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judges consider the standing of every plaintiff, they may better consider how to
protect the interests of the plaintiffs without going beyond that scope to protect the
universe of similarly situated persons.179
Standing law reveals two things. The constitutional problem is not the
existence of a constitutionally defective law, but the threat of enforcement of that
constitutionally defective law against particular persons. Having identified a plaintiff
with standing, the court cannot grant relief “that would not prevent likely,
impending, or ongoing harm to the plaintiff herself.”180 That limitation includes
relief that goes beyond preventing harm to the plaintiff by attempting to prevent
harm to people not before the court, where unnecessary to prevent harm to the
plaintiff.
Califano v. Yamasaki181 assumes this party specificity, which lower courts have
ignored in issuing universal injunctions in immigration cases. Courts quote Califano
for the complete-relief principle, that an injunction should be no more burdensome
than necessary to accord complete relief.182 But the oft-quoted sentence describing
the complete-relief requirement ends with three oft-ignored words—“to the
plaintiffs.”183 A court must ensure that the plaintiff obtains complete relief, but
need not ensure that anyone else obtains complete relief. And the failure to accord
relief beyond the plaintiff does not deprive the plaintiff of complete relief. Califano
relied on the traditional conception of an injunction that stops enforcement as to
the parties, not the new conception of providing freedom for the universe from a
constitutionally defective law. Those three words in Califano were intentional and
essential to the Court’s conception of constitutional litigation and cannot be
disregarded as the lower courts have.184
Amanda Frost argues that Article III does not necessarily limit courts’
adjudicatory or remedial authority to the plaintiffs, pointing to the mootness
doctrine of “capable of repetition yet evading review.”185 A case is not moot (or
mootness will be excepted) when, although the named plaintiff is not presently
harmed or threatened with future harm, the injury is reasonably likely to reoccur in
the future and the claim is so transitory that the injury would cease of its own force
before litigation (including all appeals) could be completed.186 Common
applications of capable-of-repetition include in constitutional challenges to holiday-
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season religious displays (the holiday season lasts approximately one month)187 and
to laws restricting abortion (the pregnancy ends within, at most, nine months).188
Courts hear these cases despite potential mootness, because they otherwise would
never have an opportunity to adjudicate and resolve important constitutional issues
arising in these time-sensitive contexts.
For a case to not be moot under this doctrine, the injury must be capable of
repetition as to the plaintiff, through a showing that she will be subjected to the
challenged unlawful conduct in the future.189 The plaintiff must show that she will
encounter the constitutionally invalid religious display in the future or that she
might become pregnant and seek an abortion (and be injured by potential
enforcement of the abortion restriction) in the future. That a non-party might be
injured through enforcement of the same abortion restriction or the erection of the
religious display in the future does not avoid mootness. The court’s Article III
jurisdiction remains bound to future enforcement or threatened enforcement
against this plaintiff, not against the universe of non-party individuals who might be
subject to future enforcement. If one plaintiff brings an individual action
challenging a seasonal religious display then moves out of the state, the court would
find the case moot, even though the government may erect the display the
following year, causing constitutional injury to non-parties offended by the display.
One of those non-parties would have to establish standing and join or file a new
lawsuit challenging the future display.
Finally, neither of the explanations discussed above justifies the shift in
conception of constitutional litigation from injuries caused by individualized
enforcement of the law to injuries caused by the existence of the law itself.190 To
the extent the shift derives from the creation of the declaratory judgment, it
misunderstands that remedy. The Declaratory Judgment Act empowers courts to
“declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party;” it permits
determinations of the rights of interested parties to the federal litigation, rather than
permitting free-standing declarations of rights in the abstract. The statute speaks of
parties, which has a known meaning in litigation, rather than persons, which might
consider people beyond the parties. Declaratory judgments also do not place the
law itself before the court, but the rights and relations of particular people with
respect to that law.
In Doran v. Salem Inn,191 the Court endorsed particularized, non-universal
remedies as to both injunctive and declaratory relief, showing that the declaratory
judgment remedy operates to protect parties against enforcement of the challenged
law, as does the injunctive remedy.192 And the Court has emphasized that
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injunctions and declaratory judgments have the same practical effect.193 If
injunctions are limited to protecting the plaintiffs and do not prohibit enforcement
of the challenged laws against non-parties, then declaratory judgments must be
similarly limited. Declaratory relief is narrower than injunctive relief in not
imposing an immediate prohibition on the defendant’s conduct, but relying on the
persuasive force of the judgment to convince state officials to rethink the law and
its enforcement.194 Declaratory judgments are famously a “milder alternative” to the
“strong medicine’” of the injunction.195 If the stronger injunction controls
government officials only as to the plaintiffs, the milder declaratory remedy should
not carry a broader “who” in its scope.
As to the expansion of Ex Parte Young beyond antisuit injunctions, these cases
still involve threatened enforcement of a law against particular individuals. All that
has changed is that enforcement occurs in a non-judicial context—the couple
seeking a marriage license, the defendant shackled without cause, or the
municipality denied federal funds. That the enforcement mechanism is
administrative rather than judicial does not change that the focus remains on the
risk or threatened enforcement as to an identifiable individual.
c. Litigant Behavior
The prospect that one district judge can enjoin enforcement of a law as to the
universe of targets also promotes forum-shopping and plaintiff-shopping. Those
opposed to the target laws, regulations, and policies seek the right plaintiffs and the
right court to take-out the law in all applications in one judicial shot. When Texas
and other Republican-led states sought to challenge immigrant-friendly policies of
the Obama Administration, Texas took the lead and filed suit in the Southern
District of Texas, with review in the Fifth Circuit. Beneficiaries of those policies
went to federal court in New York for a ruling that the policies remained
enforceable in other states. Opponents of the Trump Administration’s
immigration-restricting policies found plaintiffs with family or associates seeking
entry to the United States and focused their litigation efforts in Hawaii,
Washington, and California, with review in the Ninth Circuit, or Maryland, with
review in the Fourth Circuit. It is neither an accident nor a surprise that Austin,
Texas did not challenge the sanctuary-city restrictions in the Fifth Circuit.196
Forum- or plaintiff-shopping is not inherently problematic. But universal
injunctions make it risk-free and asymmetrical, allowing plaintiffs to, in Bray’s
Id. (quoting Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971)).
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words, “shop ’til the statute drops.”197 If Court I declares the law constitutionally
valid, that decision has no preclusive effect on non-parties to that action; a different
plaintiff can file a separate challenge to the same law in Court II,198 subject to some
precedential effect (depending on what court addressed the challenged law in Court
I).199 If Court I declares the challenged law invalid and issues a universal injunction,
it ends the game200—the challenged law is unenforceable against anyone anywhere,
unless the universal injunction is reversed on appeal. Non-parties need not take the
extra steps of joining the action and expanding the injunction or obtaining their
own injunctions.201 For efficiency’s sake, challengers will find the right plaintiffs and
the right court and halt enforcement as quickly as possible. But they incur no cost
(other than the risk of ongoing enforcement) if they guess wrong and must take a
second bite at the apple.
3. Non-Universality in every court
The impropriety of universal injunctions (or the demand for particularized
injunctions) does not vary by court. Universal injunctions are inappropriate because
a court should not prohibit government from enforcing the challenged laws,
regulations, or policies beyond the named plaintiffs. They therefore are
inappropriate whether issued by one district judge in the Western District of
Washington, issued by a three-judge district court, affirmed by a panel of a regional
court of appeals, affirmed by an en banc court of appeals, or affirmed by a
unanimous Supreme Court. This is not about “a single judge sitting on an island in
the Pacific” halting enforcement of federal law through lawless individual action, as
Attorney General Jeff Sessions complained about Hawaii’s injunction of
enforcement of the travel restriction.202 Universal injunctions would be as improper
if the Supreme Court were granted original jurisdiction to issue them at the outset
or if all constitutional challenges to federal laws were adjudicated by three-judge
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district courts (as they were prior to 1976203), as some have proposed.204 No court,
regardless of place in the judicial hierarchy or number of members, should issue a
universal injunction protecting beyond the plaintiffs.
Rejecting universal injunctions by any court does not mean that a federal
judgment declaring a law, regulation, or policy constitutionally defective and
enjoining its enforcement has no effect beyond the named plaintiffs. The effect
derives from the precedential force of the court’s opinion analyzing the validity of
the law—the decision of Court I, declaring the attorney regulations invalid as to
NWIRP, serves as precedent for Court II considering the validity of those
regulations if the federal government seeks or threatens to enforce against them
against attorneys other than NWIRP. Precedential force varies by court—a district
court decision granting the injunction has only persuasive force for the next court, a
regional court of appeals decision affirming the injunction has binding force on
district courts within its circuit and persuasive force elsewhere; and a Supreme
Court affirmance has binding force on all courts in all districts and circuits.205
Supreme Court affirmance of a non-universal party-specific injunction by a
district court does not render that injunction universal or extend it to prohibit
enforcement of the challenged law against non-plaintiffs to that action. The effect
is similar, of course. Supreme Court affirmance means all future enforcement
efforts must fail and all pre-enforcement actions to enjoin enforcement must
succeed, because all courts are bound by the Court’s pronouncement that the
challenged law is constitutionally defective and not enforceable.206 But the
affirmance resolves the question as a matter of the law of precedent, the effect of
one ruling on a second action involving enforcement against people who were not
party to first case. It is not a function of the law of judgments or as an injunction
prohibiting enforcement against those non-parties.
Universal injunctions from lower courts elide these distinctions between
precedent and judgment and between binding and persuasive precedent. By passing
on the constitutional question and enjoining government officials from enforcing
the challenged law against the universe of potential targets, the lower court resolves
the legal issue for the country, something only the Supreme Court can do.207 And
the Supreme Court does this not as a matter of a single universal injunction, but as
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a matter of precedent established in one decision involving one set of parties, to be
applied in future litigation involving other parties.
This responds to Frost’s argument that critics of universality prefer the disputeresolution model of the judicial role over the competing law-declaration focus.208
Particularity or non-universality is warranted not because dispute resolution is more
important than law declaration or that law-declaration is incidental to dispute
resolution. Rather, both judicial roles are essential, but operate in distinct spheres.
Dispute resolution operates in the instant case, resolving the dispute between the
parties, as by enjoining government officials from enforcing the challenged law
against the plaintiffs. Law declaration operates through precedential effect in
subsequent litigation involving different enforcement efforts against different
parties.
B. Expanding the Scope of the Injunction by Expanding the Scope of Litigation
Universal injunctions—injunctions that prohibit enforcement of the challenged
laws, regulations, and policies beyond the named plaintiffs—are impermissible. But
that does not mean constitutional must be atomized to single rightsholder/plaintiffs or that judgments cannot have broader effects. The solution is
not to extend the court’s remedial authority beyond the plaintiffs. The solution is to
expand the who of the litigation, thereby expanding the permissible who of the
injunction, whether formally or in practice. This allows a judgment and injunctive
remedy to have broader effects than protecting one individual, while keeping the
court’s remedial focus on the parties to litigation.
Each method of expanding the litigation has limitations, drawbacks, and
difficulties. Each is more complicated, more difficult to establish, and takes longer
than allowing the court to avoid intermediate steps and issue universal injunctions
in individual lawsuits. But the difficulty of satisfying the requirements of these
procedures or the risk of delays does not warrant ignoring them or adopting a new
procedure (universal injunctions) that obviates established litigation processes.
1. Class Actions
A court can certify an injunctive class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(2), where “the party opposing the class” has “acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class,” so “that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”209
In pre-enforcement actions, government officials oppose the class, their actions in
enforcing or threatening to enforce the challenged law, regulation, or policy injure
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the class generally, and an injunction prohibiting enforcement against the class
protects the class. A class-wide injunction is not a universal injunction. Rather, it
protects the plaintiff, because the plaintiff is the class, which assumes an identity
and legal status independent of the representative individual plaintiff.210 The district
court took this step in the litigation challenging hurdles to abortion access for
detained undocumented unaccompanied pregnant minors, certifying a class of “all
pregnant, unaccompanied immigrant minor children (UCs) who are or will be in the
legal custody of the federal government” and granted a class-wide preliminary
injunction.211
The Supreme Court enacted the current version of FRCP 23(b)(2) in 1966 to
achieve two goals related to constitutional litigation.
The class mechanism ensures that courts can issue broad indivisible relief
where appropriate. It responded to Massive Resistance to Brown, in which courts
and school districts admitted named African-American plaintiffs into all-white
schools, but without altering the basic structure or operation of the school system
and without benefitting non-party African-American students.212 By certifying a
class of prospective African-American students wishing to attend integrated
schools, the court could issue an injunction compelling broader structural changes,
a remedy benefitting all class members as parties to the case.213 This injunction is
not universal, because it does not protect beyond the plaintiffs to the case. Rather,
the rule expands who is a party before the court and therefore who is and may be
properly protected by a particularized injunction.214 The court may narrow the
scope and effect of the injunction by narrowing the scope of the class.215
Rule 23(b)(2) also broadens the preclusive effect of the judgment, eliminating
the asymmetrical or one-way preclusion plaguing universal injunctions in individual
actions.216 Prior to 1966, non-parties retained control over how an injunction might
affect them.217 If the court awarded relief, a non-party could opt-in to the class after
the fact, reaping the benefits of the injunction. If the court did not award relief, the
non-party could remain out of the case, unbound by preclusion and free to file a
new lawsuit.218 Under amended 23(b)(2), the identities of all potential class
members must be clear and in the case when the court certifies the class, subjecting
individual members to the full preclusive effect of the decision. Dissenting from
Iowa v. Sosna, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975).
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universality in Chicago, Judge Manion explained that the universal injunction bound
the government from denying funds to any sanctuary jurisdiction, but if Chicago
had lost, any other sanctuary jurisdiction could have filed its own action, unbound
by the earlier judgment.219 The class mechanism eliminates that “one-way ratchet,”
by binding all municipalities in the class to the same extent the judgment binds the
government.220
Allowing universal injunctions in non-class cases renders Rule 23(b)(2)
superfluous.221 If a single plaintiff bringing an individual suit can obtain an
injunction barring enforcement of the challenged law as to everyone in the world,
no plaintiff would pursue a class action. Not having to certify the class removes an
issue the plaintiff must litigate. And the lone plaintiff (and her attorneys) can seek
relief, knowing that others remain free to bring future actions if this one is
unsuccessful in halting enforcement of the law.
The incentive to avoid Rule 23 grows because certifying classes can be
unwieldy and difficult, especially for broad and disparate groups in which members
may be affected by the same law in different ways.222 Class certification is timeconsuming,223 while TROs and preliminary injunctions are issued in fast-moving,
even emergent situations. Courts have cut back on aggregate litigation in recent
years,224 although Carroll criticizes retrenchment as a “myopic” application of fears
of unwieldy aggregated-damages class actions to the different context of civil rights
injunctions.225 But the difficulty of litigating class actions does not justify
circumventing that rule by allowing individual litigation to provide effective classwide relief.226 Moreover, there is no disconnect between the urgency of preliminary
relief from threatened enforcement of a constitutionally defective law and the
slowness of class certification, because courts can issue class-wide preliminary
injunctive relief, prohibiting enforcement of the challenged law against the putative
class, even before formally certifying the class.227
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While Califano approved a nationwide class (and thus an injunction protecting
all members of the class),228 Morley argues that such classes should be
presumptively avoided. He prefers circuit-wide classes, which who is protected
through class-wide relief, while leaving the government the opportunity to relitigate
in other cases (whether individual or class actions) in other regional circuits.229
2. Associational Standing
The plaintiff in a constitutional case might be an entity suing on behalf of its
members who are adversely affected by the challenged law, regulation, or policy.230
An injunction issued in an associational standing case does not create or justify a
universal injunction. The injunction runs in favor of the association and its
members, carrying the same scope as the individuals suing on their own behalf.231
Association standing creates something like a practical class action of all
association members. Having an entity sue on behalf of its members expands the
scope of the injunction, because the entity may have thousands of members spread
across the country or the world, all of whom enjoy the protections of the injunction
by virtue of being members of the protected plaintiff-organization. An individual
avails herself of the injunction’s protections against future enforcement by showing
membership in the association.
But the doctrine imposes additional requirements, which makes it less an
obvious end-run around than purely universal injunctions in individual cases.
Associational standing requires that members of the association would have had
individual standing, that the interests protected in the action are “germane” to the
association’s purposes, and that the claim and injunctive remedy do not require
individual participation.232
Associational standing has been present, but not resolved, in these immigration
cases. One plaintiff in IRAP was the Middle East Studies Association, suing on
behalf of members whose academic work would be limited by being unable to
interact with students and scholars from the targeted nations.233 The Fourth Circuit
did not resolve the organization’s standing, having found standing for a different
plaintiff (an individual) sufficient to proceed with the action.234 Assuming
individuals can show membership in the Association, associational standing seems
present—affected members would have standing and protecting the ability of its
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members to interact with students and scholars is germane to that organization’s
purposes.
3. Third-Party Standing
An individual plaintiff, whether a person or organization, may assert third-party
standing.235 The person or entity claims an injury from defendant’s conduct and
sues to vindicate the constitutional rights of other persons with whom the plaintiff
has a business, professional, or other close relationship and where it is not feasible
for individual right-holders to sue on their own behalf.236 Permissible relationships
for third-party standing include businesses suing on behalf of potential
customers,237 medical professionals suing on behalf of patients,238 and lawyers and
advocates suing on behalf of clients. 239 Hawaii, Washington, and Minnesota
proceeded on third-party standing on behalf of students, teachers, and scholars
who would study and work at universities there, but were prevented from doing so
by the travel order.240 IRAP and HIAS sued on behalf of the refugees who they
would help resettle but who were barred by the travel order from entering the
United States.241
An injunction granted to one plaintiff asserting third-party standing may
produce an expansive injunction in several respects. The scope of the injunction
varies with the scope of the plaintiff’s base of clients or customers. It may be
difficult to determine the plaintiff’s clients or customers; Hawaii argued that a
universal injunction was appropriate because it could not identify the individuals
who might apply to work or study at its universities as to come within the
injunction’s protections against enforcement of the travel order.242 The injunction
becomes universal because Every refugee who might be subject to enforcement of
the challenged travel ban is a potential IRAP client; every student and scholar might
be a potential student or faculty member at a Hawaiian university.
This uncertainty affects judicial enforcement of an existing injunction, not its
scope when entered. The injunction could be written to protect the plaintiff (IRAP
or Hawaii), then leave to later enforcement efforts whether the person targeted for
future enforcement of the challenged law is connected to the named plaintiff and
thus protected by the injunction. In other words, if the government attempts to
enforce the travel ban against an individual, Hawaii can argue to the court that the
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individual is a potential student protected by the injunction and that enforcement
of the travel ban against her is inconsistent with the injunction. But it is
unnecessary for the injunction protecting Hawaii to also protect Washington,
Minnesota, or another state and the students and scholars whom those states wish
to bring to their universities. IRAP can do the same as to a refugee denied entry,
but it is unnecessary for the injunction protecting IRAP to also protect other
refugee-resettlement organizations and their potential clients.
The idea of “bona fide relationship” performs some analytical work here. In
granting certiorari as to the injunction prohibiting enforcement of the second travel
order, the Supreme Court stayed the injunction except as to “foreign nationals who
have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the
United States.”243 The Ninth Circuit applied the same standard to narrow the
injunction barring enforcement of the third EO, rejecting a “worldwide” injunction
as to all nationals of the affected countries.244 The Fourth Circuit did the same as to
the injunction protecting IRAP and its potential refugee clients.245
Where a court enjoins enforcement of the challenged law as to an entity
asserting third-party standing, it can demand a “bona fide relationship” between
that plaintiff and any rights-holders seeking the protections of the injunction.
Enforcing an injunction protecting IRAP or Hawaii, the court overseeing the
injunction must decide whether a foreign national subject to possible enforcement
of the travel ban has a “credible claim of a bona fide relationship” specifically with
IRAP or with Hawaii or another plaintiff. If she has such a relationship, the existing
injunction protects her (as someone on whose behalf the plaintiffs had sued) and
enforcement of the EO is prohibited. If she does not have such a relationship, the
injunction does not protect her and the federal government can enforce the travel
ban to bar person from entering the country, subject to a new or expanded
injunction protecting her or an organization with which she has that credible claim
of a bona fide relationship.
4. Incidental Benefits and Spillover Effects
An injunction’s “who” may expand in practice when relief accorded to the
named plaintiffs in an individual action incidentally inures to the benefits of other
persons similarly situated. Maureen Carroll describes this as a “system-wide”
remedy that provides relief as broad as the challenged government policy or
practice.246 Morley describes this in terms of indivisibility of rights and remedies.247
Divisible rights belong to the plaintiffs alone and can be remedied by a limited
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injunction protecting the plaintiffs alone.248 With indivisible rights, the rights of one
person cannot be separated from the rights of others, thus a remedy benefitting one
person must benefit other people similarly situated.249
One example might be school desegregation—an individual African-American
plaintiff having shown a constitutional violation of being prevented to attend a
white public school, the court might order integration of the public schools by
requiring schools to reform their admission policies for all African-American
students.250 But history shows that such system-wide relief is not inherent to school
desegregation—courts enjoined school officials to admit individuals without
ordering system-wide relief, prompting the expansion of injunctive class actions.251
A better example involves claims challenging prison conditions. Protecting one
plaintiff prisoner by ordering government officials to remove raw sewage from the
prison floors benefits other prisoners, since the prison cannot clean sewage as to
one prisoner and not others; eliminating overcrowding for one prisoner effectively
eliminates overcrowding for other prisoners held in less-crowded prisons. Another
example is legislative redistricting—an injunction remedying a constitutionally
invalid district will order the government to draw a new district, a remedy
benefitting all voters whose rights were infringed by the previous, constitutionally
infirm district.252 A final example involves challenges to public religious displays—
the injunction protects one plaintiff from the offense of having to come across a
display of the Ten Commandments in the courthouse by ordering government to
remove the display, benefitting non-parties who also might be offended, since
government cannot remove the display for one person and not others.
Laycock offers a related situation in which government officials cannot
distinguish plaintiffs from non-plaintiffs. The court enjoined overly aggressive
practices in enforcing a state motorcycle helmet law.253 An individual patrol officer
could not know whether the motorcyclist against whom he was enforcing the law
had been a plaintiff, was protected by the injunction, and placed the officer in
danger of violating the court order; the court therefore properly enjoined the
forbidden practices as to all motorcyclists in the state.254 But this seems a rare
situation, one that could be addressed by establishing a 23(b)(2) class of
motorcyclists in the state and obtaining a class-wide injunction.
Id. at 524–25.
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One point of confusion is between these incidental spillover benefits to nonparties and considerations of public interest that are required in the injunction
analysis. Frost argues that if the court must account for concerns of non-party
members of the public in deciding whether to grant an injunction, the court also
can protect non-party members of the public in the injunction.255 In deciding
whether to issue an injunction, the court considers the public interest and balances
the equities.256 This analysis is concerned with potential conflicts between the
injunction protecting the named party and the broader public, with the goal of
balancing the interests of the individual plaintiff and against the possible competing
interests of the public at large. But accounting for countervailing public interests in
deciding whether to issue the injunction is different from protecting the public at
large by mandating spillover in the injunction itself.
Frost offers an example of a challenge to a voter-ID law, in which a non-party
may believe that the absence of a voter-ID requirement abridges her right to vote,
but would lack Article III standing to bring such a claim.257 But the injunction
analysis accounts for the competing concerns Frost raises. In balancing the equities
and determining whether an injunction prohibiting enforcement of a voter-ID law
is in the public interest, the district court accounts for the negative externalities
upon voters who would be protected by the ID law (the people the government
sought to protect by enacting the law in the first instance). That is different from
extending the benefits of the injunction to everyone similarly situated (rather than
adverse to) the plaintiff.
Courts also should not assume that only a broad injunction is sufficient. Court
may order general remedies—ordering defendant officials to “remedy
constitutionally deficient prison conditions” or “cease enforcing the challenged
law”—and leave to officials the discretion of how to achieve that obligation. If the
government believes a narrower change sufficient to satisfy the injunction, it can
pursue that narrower option. The only requirement is that any remedy protect the
named plaintiffs. And no one can complain that the injunction does not protect
others.
Granting incidental or spillover benefits to non-parties does not make the
injunction universal or expand the “who” the injunction protects. Unlike the named
plaintiff, the non-party cannot enforce the injunction if the government acts
inconsistent with the court’s order and the government cannot be held in contempt
for its actions as to non-parties. If a non-party believes government officials have
failed to make sufficient progress in redressing the constitutional violations, she
cannot move the court to act and push the defendants. Only the plaintiff can
enforce the injunction, and if the party is satisfied with the pace of the defendant’s
compliance, a non-party can do nothing about that. Others may benefit from the
litigation decisions the plaintiff makes, but the decisions are the plaintiff’s to make.
To gain direct protection and the right to ask the court to enforce, non-parties must
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obtain their own injunctions (using the first decision for some precedential value)
prohibiting enforcement of the challenged laws, regulations, or policies as to them.
5. Voluntary Compliance as to Non-Parties
Government officials, enjoined from enforcing the challenged law as to the
named plaintiffs, may go further than the injunction and cease enforcing the law
against other persons.258 They may do so for many reasons—convenience,
agreement with the decision, or belief that the precedential force of the decision
ensures that later courts will agree that the law is constitutionally invalid and enjoin
or reject future enforcement against a different group of rights-holders.259 State and
local officials may do so out of cost concerns—a defeat in future constitutional
litigation arising from actual or threatened enforcement against others may result in
awards of attorney’s fees.260 This represents the other sphere for law declaration261-the declaration of law in the course of issuing the injunction may prompt
government officials to cease all enforcement efforts against all persons, even if the
injunction does not compel them to do so.
Voluntary compliance played a substantial role in marriage-equality litigation,
before and after the Supreme Court decided the constitutional question. Having
been enjoined from enforcing same-sex-marriage bans and having been compelled
to issue marriage licenses to plaintiff couples, officials in many states went further,
voluntarily issuing marriage licenses to all same-sex couples.262 That has not
happened with respect to immigration and immigration-adjacent matters, reflecting
the Trump Administration’s understandable desire to fight these to the end, as well
as the stages in which much these cases stand. Government officials are not
required to comply beyond the named plaintiffs, and executive officials do not
violate the Constitution or their oaths by refusing to voluntarily comply or by
waiting for new injunctions.263
What constitute “the end” of this process is unclear. The popular perception is
that the end is a Supreme Court determination of the constitutional validity of the
law; once the Court speaks to the validity of the travel ban or the sanctuary-city
regulations, the government will cease all enforcement against all persons. But, as
noted above, the judgment of the Supreme Court in a case arising from an
individual injunction (as opposed to a class injunction or an injunction protecting a
broad group of an association’s members or clients) does not compel this.264
Assuming some form of departmentalism in which judicial understandings of the
Constitution do not preempt the popular branches from adopting their own
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understandings of the Constitution,265 the executive could rely on his constitutional
conclusions that the law remains valid and enforceable against others, at least until a
new or expanded injunction prohibits enforcement against that next group of
rights-holders. In following a Supreme Court decision and declining to enforce the
challenged law as to non-plaintiffs, the executive engages in a form of voluntary
compliance.
Universal injunctions reflect lower-court impatience with the process of
precedent and voluntarily compliance, issued on the belief that non-parties should
be as protected as parties from enforcement of the challenged law.266 But there is
no obvious reason for that, at least under the traditional conception of
constitutional defects being about enforcement against a target rather than the
enactment or existence of the law itself. Courts granting universal injunctions
assume the government will not question the scope of the injunction because
officials voluntarily comply as to all non-parties similarly situated.267 Plaintiffs
remain protected against enforcement by the judgment, regardless of what else
government officials do as to other rights-holders. Any value or need to protect
non-parties against enforcement of constitutionally suspect laws268 derives from
government’s voluntary decisions not to enforce. Universal injunctions, overbroad
as to “who,” deprive executive officials of that choice and relieve rights-holders of
the obligation to take the additional step of commencing new litigation.
C. Trying, and Failing, to Defend Universal Injunctions
Despite the arguments described above, universal injunctions are becoming
common and routine.269 During argument in Trump v. Hawaii, Justice Gorsuch
questioned Hawaii’s counsel about “this troubling ris of this nationwide injunction,
cosmic injunction . . . not limited to relief for the parties at issue or even a class
action.” And counsel admitted to sharing Gorsuch’s impulse about the overbroad
remedy.270
Courts in these immigration and immigration-adjacent actions have been
unhesitant and unrepentant in issuing such injunctions. And they have done so with
little or no explanation or justification, beyond listing singular reasons. Only in
Chicago v. Sessions, where the district court denied to stay a universal injunction271
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and the court of appeals affirmed the universal injunction,272 did the courts offer
detailed support for the practice. No justification withstands close scrutiny. All
either fail to support the universal injunction or prove too much, making
universality the default in all challenges to the validity of all federal laws,
regulations, and policies, despite insistence to the contrary.
This part considers, and rejects, the reasons offered by courts in these classes
of immigration and by commentators supporting the practice.
1. Supreme Court Approval
The Supreme Court approved the practice of universal injunctions in concept,
at least implicitly. The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit by an evenly divided Court
in Texas v. United States, including the universal scope of the injunction.273 In a per
curiam opinion granting certiorari and staying the universal preliminary injunctions
against the second travel ban, the Court allowed the injunction to continue to
protect the plaintiffs “and those similarly situated.”274 Both appear to accept
universality (as narrowed in some respects) and protection for non-parties. The
district court in Chicago cited the Fourth Circuit in IRAP II (on the second travel
ban) in supporting the universal injunction against the sanctuary-city funding
regulations.275
There are reasons to doubt the force of these decisions. At a minimum, they do
not resolve the issue.
An affirmance by an evenly divided Court carries limited precedential force,
depriving Texas of meaningful authority for the practice.276 Trump v. IRAP was a per
curiam opinion resolving a petition for certiorari and motion for stay pending
appeal, without full merits briefing as to the scope of the injunction and without
explanation or analysis of whether an injunction could or should protect beyond
the plaintiffs. The Court never reached the merits of the constitutional challenge,
dismissing the appeal and vacating the injunction as moot when the ban lapsed by
its own terms in September 2017, meaning the Court never had an opportunity to
consider the scope of the injunction on its merits.277 If the court did approve of
universal injunctions in these cases, it did so without considering or explaining why.
And the Court was not unanimous on the point. Justice Thomas dissented in
part for himself and Justices Alito and Gorsuch. Citing Califano’s complete-relief
principle and emphasizing that relief should run “to the plaintiffs,” Thomas argued
that “a court's role is ‘to provide relief’ only ‘to claimants ... who have suffered, or
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will imminently suffer, actual harm.’”278 Courts act to protect parties from future
injuries from enforcement of challenged laws and regulations, not to issue orders
benefitting the uninverse of affected non-parties.
2. Equal Protection and the Rule of Law
Courts insist that particularized, plaintiff-only non-universal injunctions raise
equal protection and rule-of-law problems, by prohibiting enforcement of federal
law against some persons or entities (parties to the suit and the injunction) while
permitting enforcement of the same law against other people or entities (nonparties not protected by the injunction). The district court in Chicago explained that
“[a]ll similarly-situated persons are entitled to similar outcomes under the law, and
as a corollary, an injunction that results in unequal treatment of litigants appears
arbitrary.”279 Leaving the federal government free to administer the funding
regulations, which were declared invalid as to Chicago, against other states and
cities “flies in the face of the rule of law and the role of the courts to ensure the
rule of law is enforced.”280 The Fourth Circuit framed this in terms of the
“message” of the law—allowing continued enforcement of the travel ban against
similarly situated non-plaintiffs sends the “message” that non-plaintiffs “are
outsiders, not full members of the political community.”281
The short answer to the equal protection argument is that parties and nonparties are not similarly situated and so are not entitled to similar outcomes.
“Because the plaintiff is the one who took the initiative and sued, it is the plaintiff
who is protected. Others can receive the same protection if they take the same
action by bringing their own suits (invoking the authority of the earlier
decision).”282 Stated differently, “X (whether rich or poor) had to sue the
government to win, and now Y (whether rich or poor) also has to sue the
government to win.”283 Were Y to sue the government and obtain her own
injunction prohibiting enforcement of the challenged law against her, Y and X
become similarly situated—and any differential treatment disappears, because both
are protected by an injunction against future enforcement of the challenged law.
Concretely, if Chicago obtains an injunction protecting its funding but New York
City does not, there is no equal protection problem in stripping New York City of
funds but not Chicago, because the cities are not similarly situated. When New
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York City obtains its own injunction protecting its funding, the cities become
similarly situated and treated the same—neither can be stripped of its funding.
The longer answer is that the equal-protection argument misapprehends
judicial review, the structure of the federal courts, and the nature of constitutional
judicial decisionmaking.
Constitutional review has been delegated, at least in part,284 to federal courts,
which resolve constitutional questions in the course of resolving concrete legal
disputes between discrete parties.285 Federal-court decisionmaking is distributed
among three levels of a hierarchical structure. The two lower tiers are
geographically dispersed and its precedential effect is geographically limited—a
court of appeals creates binding precedent for itself and all district courts within its
circuit, while a district court creates persuasive authority but has no binding effect,
even within its district.286 Only the Supreme Court at the top of the hierarchy has
nationwide precedential reach, but its original jurisdiction is limited.287
Temporary disuniformity of federal law is inherent in multiple federal courts
performing constitutional review in discrete factual situations.288 It constitutes a
feature rather than a bug in a system that relies on “percolation” of issues in lower
courts. Multiple district and circuit judges have the opportunity to express their
views. And the process achieves a balanced result, either through lower-court
consensus that obviates Supreme Court resolution or lower-court disagreement that
gives the Supreme Court a fuller legal and factual record with which to work when
it ultimately resolves the legal question.289 Either approach yields ultimate
uniformity of federal law, albeit at the cost of temporary disuniformity as multiple
cases in multiple courts wend through the judicial process in mu.290
Universal injunctions short-circuit that percolation process by allowing one
district court (with affirmance by one circuit panel) to halt all enforcement against
all persons, as a matter of a single judgment. This allows one lower court to make

Cf. Blackman & Wasserman, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 252–53; Lawson and
Moore, supra note ___, 1269–70; Walsh, supra note 205, at 1715; Wasserman, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 7–8.
285 Bray, supra note 11, at 461–62; Frost, supra note ___, at m 44-46; supra notes ___ and accompanying
text.
286 Bray, supra note ___, at 465; Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges, supra note 205, at 1339–40;
Fallon, Fact and Fiction, supra note 205, at 923 n.31.
287 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl.2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012); see generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
138 (1803). The state plaintiffs in Hawaii v. Trump, Washington v. Trump, and Texas v. United States could
have framed the cases to create a controversy between the United States and a state for original
jurisdiction under § 1251(b)(2). But (b)(2) jurisdiction is concurrent; district courts had jurisdiction
over the actions because the states’ claims arose under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
Supreme Court practice has been to decline original jurisdiction over such cases, pushing the state
plaintiffs to district court and the ordinary review process.
288 Bray, supra note 11, at 461; Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1605–06
(2008).
289 Bray, supra note 11, at 46.
290 Id.
284

law for the nation.291 This compels the Supreme Court to resolve the matter on
review of a single case rather than a broader record of multiple lower-court
analyses. More problematically, some faster-moving immigration cases been
resolved at the stage of a preliminary-injunction (or a temporary restraining order
treated as a preliminary injunction).292 Because orders granting preliminary
injunctions are immediately and automatically appealable,293 cases move through
the system, and to the Supreme Court, in a preliminary posture and without a full
record.294 When an evenly divided eight-Justice Court could not agree in Texas, the
Fifth Circuit decision became governing law for all persons in all places, never
having gotten beyond the preliminary-injunction stage.
Ultimate uniformity of federal law remains distinct from the universal “who”
of a single injunction. A uniform determination that a law, regulation, or policy is
constitutionally invalid produces multiple injunctions barring enforcement as to the
named plaintiffs, but not non-parties. The final decision serves as binding
precedent, establishing that any future enforcement effort against unprotected nonparties will fail, given binding precedent establishing the invalidity of the law to be
enforced.295 The result is uniformity in litigation outcomes—the challenged law
cannot be enforced—through multiple court orders.
Universal injunctions also become subject to demagogic criticism from elected
officials displeased with a ruling, as when Attorney General Jeff Sessions decried
that one “judge sitting on an island in the Pacific can issue an order that stops the
president of the United States” from enforcing federal immigration law.296 Sessions
would have lobbed the same criticism at a particularized injunction limited to
Hawaii and to the plaintiffs in the case. And he would have lobbed the same
criticism at a similar decision from a nine-justice Supreme Court affirming the
injunction and the constitutional defects in the law. But giving the injunction
broader effect than it should have lends force to criticisms of overreaching federal
judges.
Criticizing temporary disuniformity on rule-of-law grounds also fails to give
content to the concept of rule of law. It cannot begin and end with uniformity, but
must account for additional ideas—including equitable, constitutional, and practical
limitations on the scope of courts’ remedial authority, limitations on the
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precedential effect of decisions from lower courts, courts’ positions in the judicial
hierarchy,297 and other problems arising from universal injunctions. The rule of law
also includes the power of the executive to engage in and act on its constitutional
interpretation, including enforcing laws it believes constitutional when not
otherwise prohibited from doing so by a properly scoped, non-universal
injunction.298 An injunction that undercuts presidential power undercuts a
component of the rule of law.
3. Uniform Immigration Law
The Constitution empowers Congress to “establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization.”299 The Fifth Circuit justified the universal injunction in Texas
because an injunction limited to the 26 plaintiff states would result in “[p]artial
implementation” of DAPA, contrary to the Framers’ intent in Article I and
Congress’ intent in enacting current immigration statutes.300 The Fourth Circuit
adopted that idea in affirming universal injunctions against the second and third
travel bans,301 as did district courts enjoining DACA rescission.302
The uniformity argument fails in several respects. The Fifth Circuit relied on
language from Arizona v. United States303 demanding uniformity and unification of
the legislative regime governing immigration. But Arizona involved federal
preemption of a state’s laws implicating the immigration system (the challenged
state law made certain immigration violations state crimes and authorized local law
enforcement to stop and search persons suspected of being unlawfully present304);
the preemption power arose from the need to ensure uniformity and to prevent
state law from creating federal disuniformity.305 Uniformity-through-preemption
was inapplicable to the situation in Texas, in which federal regulation provided the
sole statutory rule (DAPA), but courts were in the midst of ruling on individual
challenges to the validity of enforcing that rule as to plaintiffs.
The Fifth Circuit’s take on the uniformity requirement would render ordinary
litigation impossible for constitutional challenges to immigration laws, because even
temporary disuniformity created by lower-court splits and particularized, nonuniversal injunctions would become constitutionally unacceptable. Only the
Supreme Court could decide constitutional challenges to immigration laws, but it
297
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would have to do so with no opportunity for percolation in the lower courts and
limited original jurisdiction. And, in any event, a single Supreme Court decision
does not mean a universal injunction, only binding precedent.306
A second part of the immigration-law-is-unique argument rests on geographic
dispersal of people affected by immigration laws. IRAP was brought by six
individuals scattered throughout the United States, two immigrant-resettlement
organizations on behalf of clients dispersed in the targeted countries, and an
academic organization on behalf of its members dispersed around the world.307
Hawaii sued on behalf of many unknown and dispersed students and scholars the
state hoped to bring to its universities.308 This geographic dispersal necessitated the
broad injunction. This continues conflating who and where—the injunctions
should protect the plaintiffs (including organizations’ members and clients)
wherever they are in the world, but should not protect anyone other than those
plaintiffs and their members and clients.
The Fifth Circuit in Texas also argued that a “geographically-limited injunction
would be ineffective because DAPA beneficiaries would be free to move among
states.”309 Texas established standing based on its program of issuing statesubsidized drivers’ licenses to all persons lawfully within the United States, which
would include DAPA beneficiaries able to show lawful presence or employment
authorization; Texas would be required to spend millions of dollars subsidizing
licenses for people in the United States under an unconstitutional executive
policy.310 Texas therefore could not obtain complete relief from an injunction
barring enforcement of DAPA only in Texas, as by prohibiting the grant of lawful
status to otherwise-unlawfully present persons in Texas. If the United States could
continue to defer removal and accord lawful presence or work authorization to an
individual in a non-plaintiff state (such as Illinois or New York), that individual
could move to Texas and apply for a subsidized license. Only by eliminating all
enforcement of DAPA in all states could a court protect Texas against that
monetary injury.
But a universal injunction was not the only way for Texas to avoid that injury.
The narrowest effective injunction would have excused Texas from issuing drivers’
licenses to any DAPA recipients, whether in Texas or traveling to Texas from
elsewhere; that injunction would have remedied the precise injury that Texas used
to get to federal court.311 A broader, although still non-universal, effective
injunction would have prohibited the federal government from deferring removal
or according benefits to individuals present in Texas and would have ordered that
Texas need not grant nor subsidize drivers’ licenses or other benefits for persons
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claiming the right to the benefit under DAPA, whether present in Texas at the time
of the injunction or later moving there. There was no need for the court to enjoin
the federal government from exercising DAPA discretion, and according DAPA
benefits, outside the twenty-six objecting states.
Counsel for Hawaii in the travel-ban litigation urged the Supreme Court not to
resolve scope-of-the-injunction in that case because of its immigration context and
congressional power over immigration.312
4. Duplicative and Inconsistent Litigation
Faced with the prospect of being unable to issue universal injunctions and only
being able to protect named plaintiffs, courts have appeared at a loss. The district
courts in the sanctuary-cities cases emphasized that other jurisdictions would face
the same legal risk of loss of funding and that the federal government claimed the
same enforcement authority as to all states, counties, and municipalities receiving
federal funds.313 This was a problem that only a universal injunction could resolve.
Two solutions are obvious. Plaintiffs can file their constitutional cases as Rule
23(b)(2) injunctive class actions and obtain injunctions protecting the class of
persons or entities everywhere in the United States, all of whom are parties.314 Or
every individual or organization (or groups of organizations) must file separate
lawsuits and obtain separate injunctions barring enforcement of the challenged laws
as to them or their members and clients. The earlier injunction and opinion
provides some precedential value in the latter actions, depending on how far the
first case went in the judicial hierarchy. And the multiple lawsuits allow the
percolation on which good judicial decisionmaking depends.
Federal courts have come to regard the latter solution as inefficient and
insufficient, the race to issue universal injunctions reflecting impatience with the
ordinary judicial processes of particularized judgments, precedent, and percolation
of legal issues.315 The district court in Chicago insisted that because 37 counties and
cities filed an amicus brief, judicial economy counseled against compelling each to
file a separate lawsuit to have a court resolve the same legal issues resolved in that
case.316 The alternative risked a flood of duplicative litigation, as every city or
country subject to the funding restrictions must obtain its own injunction.317 The
Chicago court also feared the risk of inconsistent judgments, with one court
declaring the law invalid and enjoining enforcement as to some cities and another
court declaring the law valid and allowing enforcement as to other persons. The
Oral Argument in Trump v. Hawaii at 73-74.
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Seventh Circuit agreed that the “likelihood of widespread, duplicative litigation”
and concerns for “judicial economy counseled against requiring” many jurisdiction
to file “individual suits to decide anew the narrow legal question in the case.”318
Under the traditional conception of constitutional litigation and the way federal
constitutional adjudication should function, subsequent litigation involving
different plaintiffs does not constitute duplicative litigation. Litigation is about
enforcement of the challenged law or regulation against particular plaintiffs. The
similarity of legal issues between different cases does not alter that nature of
constitutional litigation, so it does not render separate litigation redundant or
duplicative. Each act of enforcement of a constitutionally defective law against a
different individual is a distinct constitutional violation. Each action to enjoin
enforcement against a different individual is a distinct constitutional claim involving
the rights of that plaintiff. And each individual will defend her constitutional rights
in different ways with different arguments, leading to different analyses and,
perhaps, outcomes.319 Bray captures the point, while acknowledging its
overstatement, as “there are no duplicative cases. Even if they both involve the
same legal question, your case is your case and my case is my case.”320
Any inefficiency is inherent in that limited scope of a court’s equitable powers
and in the hierarchically and geographically distributed decisionmaking of the
federal system. Efficiency justifies joinder or consolidation of these multiple claims
into a single proceeding for efficiency purposes,321 but it does not turn each
plaintiff’s claim into a single claim. These concerns cannot expand the power of a
court in a single case or alter the structure and function of the federal judiciary. And
the system of percolation understands inconsistency as a benefit, part of what lower
courts are supposed to do in moving toward a final, uniform constitutional
determination.
Bray argues that allowing universal injunctions creates a more significant
problem in the other direction—conflicting injunctions.322 An injunction issued by
one district court does not bind another district or circuit; an injunction affirmed by
one circuit does not bind another circuit. That the issuing court labeled or
purported to make its injunction universal does not alter this. But it does allow
multiple courts to expand their remedial reaches, creating a possible collision.
Imagine a case in which Court I enjoins a federal official to do x, while another
court enjoins the same official to refrain from doing x. As neither injunction takes
precedence (short of a Supreme Court decision affirming one injunction and
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reversing the other), that federal official risks violating an injunction and being held
in contempt no matter what she did.323
Following the universal injunction barring enforcement of DAPA, individuals
filed suit in two other federal districts seeking a declaration that the United States
was not bound by the injunction outside of Texas or as to people outside of Texas
and an injunction permitting the United States to enforce DAPA (and not deport
people) outside of Texas. Courts avoid this “doomsday scenario” through restraint
and good luck, both of which can run out.324 They can avoid it formally by rejecting
universal injunctions and limiting all injunctions to protecting the named plaintiffs.
Court I’s injunction prohibits enforcement as to the plaintiffs before it, but says
nothing about the parties before Court II, whose fate remains to that court’s
constitutional determination. Unfortunately, district courts display increasing
reluctance to exercise this remedial restraint.
At a minimum, federal officials remain unclear about what they are empowered
to do in enforcing federal law. Imagine Court I declares the law constitutionally
invalid and issues a universal injunction but Court II declares the law
constitutionally valid and allows the government to enforce it against. Enforcing
the law, as permitted by Court II, would place him in contempt of Court I. But
abiding by the judgment in Court I places that court and its judgment above a
contrary judgment from a co-equal court.
5. Facial Unconstitutionality
Several courts have imposed universal injunctions due to the purported facial
unconstitutionality of the challenged laws, having them unconstitutional in all
possible applications, as opposed to declaring them unconstitutional only as applied
to the plaintiffs.325 A limited, particularized, non-universal injunction is inconsistent
with the declaration of facial unconstitutionality. Having determined that the
challenged law is unconstitutional beyond the plaintiffs, a court cannot allow
continued enforcement against other rights-holders.
This misapprehends the meaning and effect of facial unconstitutionality. The
declaration of facial unconstitutionality goes to the scope of the court’s
constitutional analysis and reasoning, therefore to its precedential effect. If Court I
declares the law facially unconstitutional, Court II might use that as precedent to
declare the law unconstitutional as to future plaintiffs. A Supreme Court declaration
of facial unconstitutionality does the work for Court II—no further analysis is
necessary if binding precedent establishes that the law cannot be constitutionally
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applied in the new context or to the new parties.326 But Court I and Court II make
those constitutional determinations in the course of enjoining enforcement of the
law as to some plaintiffs. A declaration of facial unconstitutionality does not expand
the court’s remedial authority or empower it to enjoin the defendant from
enforcing against persons outside the case. The court’s order remains limited to the
plaintiffs, although the precedential effect of its pronouncement of facial invalidity
may be broader.327
6. Narrow Legal Issues
In affirming a universal injunction barring DOJ from withholding funds from
sanctuary cities, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the challenge involved “purely
a narrow issue of law; it is not fact-dependent and will not vary from one locality to
another.”328 Such a narrow question of law lends itself to broader injunctive relief
and will not benefit from percolation through additional courts.329 Some legal
issues—such as what constitutes excessive force—benefit from consideration in
multiple courts in different factual contexts that inform the legal principle. With
legal issues such as the plain meaning of a statute, “the duplication of litigation will
have little, if any, beneficial effect.”330
The dissent in Chicago rejected this approach, because it renders a nationwide
injunction appropriate in every statutory interpretation case. The similarity of legal
issues does not ensure similarity in litigation or resolution. Different parties engage
different arguments on the same legal issues, producing divergent analyses and
results, while allowing the strongest arguments to come to the fore, all to the
benefit of courts able to identify and draw on the best-reasoned opinions.331 Each
constitutional cases involves different parties, arguments, and analyses, even on
purely legal, fact-free, issues. Universal injunctions should not preempt the process
of courts working through those legal issues.
7. Proving Too Much
The district court in Chicago insisted that universal injunctions should not be the
default approach, but remain an “extraordinary remedy that should be limited by
the nature of the constitutional violation and subject to prudent use by the
courts.”332 In affirming, the Seventh Circuit agreed that universal injunctions were a
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“powerful remedy” to be “employed with discretion” in “rare cases.”333 Amanda
Frost, the strongest scholarly advocate for universal injunctions, argues that the
“default should be against issuing a nationwide injunction. A single district court
judge should not lightly assert control over federal policy for the nation, and should
allow her fellow judges to reach their own decisions in cases involving different
plaintiffs.”334
The increasing use of universal injunctions, including as to the immigration
laws discussed, suggests that universality is becoming the default in challenges to
the constitutional validity of federal law, at least federal immigration and
immigration-adjacent law. Leaving the injunction’s “who” to the prudence of
district courts is not working as a limiting principle. Or prudence can only hold for
so long and we have reached that point.
The permissible-but-rare defense also proves too much. Chicago upheld the
universal injunction against the sanctuary-city regulations in light of concerns for
uniformity, unfairness of disparate application, and the rule of law,335 each
constituting an “extraordinary” element warranting a universal injunction. But each
of those elements is present in every constitutional challenge to every federal law.
By its terms, therefore, the argument requires—or at least encourages—a district
court to issue a universal injunction to prohibit enforcement of any federal law
regulating any federal conduct.
The authority of federal officials to enforce any federal law never varies by
jurisdiction—the law and the power to enforce the law is the same nationwide.
Judicial economy always favors one lawsuit over multiple lawsuits. There would be
a flood of similar lawsuits by everyone affected by every federal law. Federal
uniformity and the unfairness of disparate application of federal law are present
with respect to every federal law. If the rule of law is undermined by enforcement
of a “likely invalid” law to persons other than the named plaintiff protected by the
injunction, it is undermined by enforcement of every federal law that one court has
declared constitutionally invalid. Despite the court’s rhetorical attempt to limit
universal injunctions to extraordinary cases, every case is extraordinary, as the court
defined it.
Frost argues that universal injunctions are uniquely necessary in the face of
executive action, such as the executive orders and regulations challenged in these
immigration cases. She argues that the executive can announce new federal policy at
the last minute, making it difficult for plaintiffs to certify a class before the policy
takes effect, then can fight class certification; only a universal injunction prevents
the executive from controlling litigation to prevent entry of injunctions that protect
more than a few individuals at a time.336 But it is not clear why this concern is
greater for federal executive action than for federal legislation; while legislation
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takes longer to enact than an executive order, the possibilities for manipulative
litigation are the same. Moreover, courts can issue preliminary relief to benefit a
putative class, even if it has not yet formally certified the class.337 So the
government does not hold exclusive power to avoid broader injunctions protecting
a broader group of plaintiffs.
IV. The Way Forward
Universal injunctions are generally inappropriate in individual constitutional
litigation and should not be issued in the mine run of cases. Universal injunctions
are specifically inappropriate in the constitutional litigation challenging the
immigration and immigration-adjacent policies discussed here. Even allowing for
broader injunctions in some circumstances, these cases do not come within those
circumstances—the rights and remedies are divisible, a narrower injunction affords
plaintiffs complete relief, a narrower injunction is commensurate with the
constitutional violation found in the threatened enforcement of the constitutionally
defective laws as to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ use class actions, associational standing,
and third-party standing would have allowed for sufficiently broad and protective
injunctions prohibiting enforcement of the challenged laws, regulations, and
policies, even if those injunctions were not universal and were particularized to the
plaintiffs.
This Part briefly describes the appropriate scope of the injunctions that should
have issued in these six categories of litigation.
A. Attorney Regulations
The injunction in NWIRP should have prohibited EOIP from enforcing the
attorney regulations as to NWIRP, by precluding EOIP from sanctioning NWIRP
or NWIRP attorneys for continuing to advise pro se litigants without filing a formal
appearance. The injunction should be nationwide in protecting NWIRP from
enforcement of the regulations in any immigration proceedings anywhere in the
country. The injunction need not and should not protect other attorneys or legalrepresentation organizations. NWIRP’s rights are unaffected by any DOJ promised
attempts to enforce the regulations against other attorneys and the particularized
injunction is commensurate with the violation of NWIRP’s First Amendment rights
from threatened enforcement. Other attorneys or organizations can file their own
lawsuits if threatened with enforcement; the district court’s First Amendment
decision in NWIRP can provide persuasive authority on the constitutional validity
of the regulations for use in future litigation.
B. Abortion Access for Detained Undocumented Unaccompanied Minors
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The district court got the “who” of both injunctions right in Garza. The
injunctions expressly and appropriately protected the three named plaintiffs and
ensured that HHS officials did not stop them from obtaining abortions. The
injunctions were properly nationwide, in that they protected the girls wherever they
were detained—Texas, where they were, or anywhere in the United States.
The injunctions need not, should not, and did not protect other undocumented
unaccompanied in-detention minors from similar HHS efforts to prevent them
from terminating pregnancies. The rights and injunctive remedies are divisible. The
rights of J.D., J.R., or J.P. protected by the injunctions are not affected by HHS
efforts to stop other girls from exercising their reproductive rights and the relief
accorded to the three plaintiffs is not less-than-complete if other girls face similar
government-imposed hurdles. Other pregnant minor detainees can file their own
lawsuits if faced with similar barriers or similar HHS efforts to prevent them from
exercising their reproductive freedom.
Wanting a broader injunction to protect all pregnant undocumented
unaccompanied minors in HHS detention, the plaintiffs took the appropriate steps
by seeking to certify a class action, expanding who qualifies as a plaintiff in the case.
The court subsequently certified a 23(b)(2) class, defined as “all pregnant,
unaccompanied immigrant minor children (UCs) who are or will be in the legal
custody of the federal government.” In other words, the court expanded the “who”
of the injunction in the appropriate manner—by using class-action procedure to
expand the “who” of the litigation.
C. Funding of Sanctuary Cities
The district courts in Chicago and Santa Clara should have issued injunctions
prohibiting DOJ from denying funding to Chicago and to Santa Clara and San
Francisco, respectively. The injunctions cannot and should not prohibit DOJ from
denying funding to any other city; neither Chicago’s nor Santa Clara’s rights are
affected by DOJ attempts to enforce the funding regulations to other jurisdictions,
nor is their relief rendered less than complete if DOJ attempts to strip funds from
other municipalities. Other jurisdictions can file their own suits if threatened with
enforcement, using the prior decisions as persuasive authority on the constitutional
validity of the regulations.
D. DAPA and DACA Rescission
The injunction in Texas would have been sufficient had it relieved Texas of the
obligation to subsidize drivers’ licenses for any DAPA recipients. Or the injunction
could have prohibited enforcement of DAPA in Texas and the twenty-five coplaintiff states; the order could have prohibited the federal government from
deferring removal to the class of immigrants in those states and from conferring
federal and state benefits to immigrants in those states. The problem of people
moving from other (non-injunction) states into Texas can be addressed by not
requiring Texas or the other plaintiff states to provide state benefits, such as

subsidized drivers’ licenses, to DAPA recipients. The federal government could
continue to provide DAPA benefits to persons in non-objecting states.
The order enjoining DACA rescission similarly should have been limited to the
plaintiff DACA recipients and the other entities and organizations bringing the suit
on behalf of particular recipients. The government could have proceeded with
rescission in other states, at least with respect to recipients who lacked bona fide
relationships with some of the plaintiffs.
E. Travel Bans
These represent the most difficult cases, although particularized, non-universal
injunctions were possible.
It is logically possible to enjion enforcement of the ban to some persons and
not others—to allow some refugees or visitors from the targeted nations into the
country and not others. And allowing enforcement of the ban to some persons,
while prohibiting enforcement as to the named plaintiffs, does not deny the named
plaintiffs complete relief.
The difficulty or uncertainty of identifying students and scholars who might
come to Hawaii or of identifying IRAP clients in the target nations can be resolved
at the enforcement stage. Faced with a future government attempt to prohibit an
individual from traveling to the United States, Hawaii or IRAP must show that the
targeted individual has a “bona fide” relationship with it that is “’formal,
documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of
evading the travel restrictions.”338 That relationship means attempted enforcement
against the person with a bona fide relationship is barred by the injunction and can
be halted by a court order enforcing the injunction. If the enforcement target lacks
that bona fide relationship, she must seek a new injunction or an extension of the
existing injunction. Either way, there is no need to expand the injunction at the
point of issuance.
The Supreme Court granted cert in Hawaii, including on the scope-ofinjunction question, so the issue could be resolved, at least in this unique context,
sooner rather than later.
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